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ABSTRACT 
 
STRATEGIC INTERACTION BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND 
POLITICAL ACTORS IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES 
 
 
Aylin Aydın 
 
PhD, Political Science 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Sabri Sayarı 
 
Spring 2012, X+115 pages 
 
Keywords: constitutional courts, judicial politics, judicial independence, judicialization 
of politics 
 
 
Until the 1990s, studies on democratic political institutions usually neglected 
the behavior of the courts outside the United States. However, recent research on 
comparative judicial politics sought to remedy this important shortcoming in the 
literature. Following the findings of these recent studies, I begin my dissertation by 
constructing a general model that explains the incentives of the incumbent governments 
to maintain the independence of the judiciary. Conducting a cross-country analysis of 
97 democracies in the world, I show that under similar political conditions the 
incumbent governments in advanced and developing democracies adopt different 
incentives to maintain the independence of the judiciary. Cross-country analyses and 
the international indicators used in these types of analyses are not without their 
weaknesses. Thus, to better determine the influence of political factors on the 
independence of the judiciary, I continue my analysis by focusing on a single 
developing democracy. Using Turkey as a case study, I seek to find out if the structure 
of the government influences the invalidation of the laws by the Constitutional Court 
and if this changes across certain case level characteristics. In the last section of the 
dissertation, I seek to explain why the opposition political parties frequently bring cases 
to the constitutional court and choose to judicialize politics although the judiciary is not 
fully independent. I argue that the approaching time of the next general election affects 
the frequency of the main opposition party’s referrals to the constitutional court. My 
argument is that this effect is conditioned by the opposition party’s predictions about its 
chances in the election. Based on the empirical evidence from the Turkish case, I refer 
to this phenomenon as strategic litigation theory. 
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ÖZET 
 
GELİŞMEKTE OLAN DEMOKRASİLERDE YÜKSEK MAHKEMELER VE 
POLİTİK AKTÖRLER ARASINDAKİ STRATEJİK ETKİLEŞİM  
  
 
Aylin Aydın 
 
Doktor, Siyaset Bilimi 
 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Sabri Sayarı 
 
Bahar 2012, X+115 sayfa 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: anayasa mahkemesi, yargı politikası, yargı bağımsızlığı, yargının 
siyasallaşması 
 
 
1990’lı yıllara kadar demokratik kurumlar üzerine yapılan araştırmalar 
çoğunlukla ya mahkemelerin çalışmalarını göz ardı etmiş ya da ABD’nin dışında kalan 
yargı sistemlerine önem vermemişlerdir. Son yıllarda literatürdeki bu boşluğu 
doldurmayı amaçlayan çalışmaları takip eden bu tez, gelişmekte olan demokrasilerde, 
yüksek mahkemeler ve politik aktörler arasındaki etkileşime odaklanmaktadır. Tezin ilk 
bölümü, idaredeki hükümetlerin yargı bağımsızlığının korunması konusunda 
sergiledikleri eğilimleri açıklayan genel bir model oluşturarak başlamaktadır. 97 ülke 
üzerine yapılan istatistiksel analiz, benzer siyasal şartlar altında gelişmiş ve gelişmekte 
olan demokrasilerde hükümetlerin yargı bağımsızlığını koruma konusunda farklı 
eğilimler sergilediklerini göstermektedir. Siyasal faktörlerin yargı bağımsızlığı 
üzerindeki etkisini daha ayrıntılı açıklayabilmek için, bu tezde ayrıca hükümet 
yapısının yüksek yargı kararları üzerindeki etkisi ve bu etkinin davadan davaya ne 
derece değiştiği Türkiye örneği ışığında açıklanmaktadır. Siyasal faktörlerin yargı 
bağımsızlığı üzerindeki etkisi incelendikten sonra, tezin son bölümünde ise 
“Gelişmekte olan demokrasilerde yargı sistemi tam olarak bağımsız olmadığı halde, 
neden muhalefet partileri sık sık anayasa mahkemesine başvurmaktadır?” sorusuna 
cevap aranmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, yaklaşan genel seçim tarihinin ana muhalafet 
partisinin anayasa mahkemesine başvurma sıklığını etkilediği, ancak bu etkinin ana 
muhalefet partisinin seçim sonucu tahminine bağlı olduğu savunulmaktadır. Tezde bu 
duruma stratejik dava açma teorisi adı verilmekte ve Türkiye örneğinden toplanan 
verilerle bu teori desteklenmektedir.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Institutions determine the rules by which the game of politics is played. 
Influenced by the new-institutionalist approach, many political scientists have directed 
a substantial amount of energy toward understanding how electoral systems, executive-
legislative arrangements, or party systems shape politics. Yet despite the vital role of 
the judiciary in the consolidation of democracies, the studies on democratic institutions 
mostly overlook the behavior of courts or their relationship with the politicians. 
Focusing on the interaction between the constitutional courts and political actors in the 
context of developing democracies, my dissertation consists of three essays each of 
which investigate this interaction from three different perspectives.  
The central question that motivates the first essay is “Why and when do the 
political actors try to create and maintain judicial independence?” To answer this 
question the proponents of ‘insurance theory’ propose a positive relationship between 
political competition and judicial independence (Ramseyer, 1994; Ginsburg, 2003; 
Finkel, 2008; Landes and Posner, 1975; Stephenson, 2003). Focusing on this theory, 
the main goal of my first essay is to test the insurance logic of judicial independence 
and explain whether -and if so how- the impact of political competition on judicial 
independence changes across advanced and developing democracies. The central 
motivation of my second essay emanates from the studies in the judicial politics 
literature that have accounted for the political contexts where judges will adopt 
strategic behavior (e.g. Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Segal, 1997; Spiller and Gely, 1992; 
Bergara et al., 2003). These studies have examined a limited set of situations under 
which the judges may be constrained, but they have not mentioned whether and to what 
extent the explanatory power of political factors on the high court’s decisions changes 
across cases. Hence, the goal of my second essay is to explain to what extent the 
2 
 
explanatory power of government structure on the constitutional courts’ invalidation of 
laws changes across cases and account for whether –and if so how- how certain case-
level factors influence the degree of the constitutional court’s strategic voting. Finally, 
my third essay addresses the question “Why and when do the opposition political 
parties frequently bring cases in front of the constitutional court and choose to 
judicialize politics although the judiciary is not fully independent?” 
Focusing on the scholarship that deals with the interaction between courts and 
the elected branches, in this brief introduction to my dissertation, first I will provide an 
overview of the central debates and recent developments in the field of judicial politics. 
I will then present my research as well as its potential contribution to the existing 
research in the field.  
 
 
 
1.1 Central Debates and Recent Developments in Judicial Politics Literature 
 
 
 
Most early works in the field of judicial politics that focused on the interaction 
between the courts and political actors primarily examined the U.S Supreme Court. 
These studies concentrated on the effect of institutional constraints and judges’ 
strategic responses to these constraints. This early scholarship of judicial politics 
outlined two approaches of judicial behavior: attitudinal approach and separation-of-
powers approach. The proponents of attitudinal approach propose that political 
institutions are unlikely to be effective in restraining the court from enacting its policy 
preferences. For that reason, they claim that the judges vote only according to their own 
ideological preferences (e.g Segal and Spaeth, 2002). The proponents of the separation-
of-powers approach, on the other hand, suggest that political actors have the capacity to 
overturn the decisions of the Supreme Court and assuming that the Supreme Court has 
rational foresight, they have argued that the Court will anticipate the reaction of the 
Congress, act strategically, and would not always decide cases in accordance with their 
own preferences (e.g Epstein and Knight, 1998).  
Although this debate is still prevalent in the field of judicial politics, since the 
1990s there have been several other developments. First, attention to comparative 
judicial politics has been steadily increasing in the field. For instance, many scholars 
have been able to show that the courts outside the United States behave strategically as 
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well. Some of these studies have included applications to executive–judicial relations in 
Russia (Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova, 2001), Argentina (Iaryczower, Spiller and 
Tomassi, 2002) and post-communist countries (Herron and Randozzo, 2003). Others 
have focused on the strategic behavior by Argentinean judges during periods of regime 
change (Helmke, 2002); accounted for the strategic use of media by the Mexican 
Supreme Court (Staton, 2010); and explained the impact of public monitoring and 
transparency of the political system on the final decision of the German Constitutional 
Court (Vanberg, 2005). 
Second, in the field of comparative judicial politics a growing number of 
scholars focused mainly on the question of whether and when courts check the elected 
branches. A group of scholars have accounted for the political conditions under which 
justices or courts rule against the government (Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002; 
Helmke, 2005; Chavez, 2004; Finkel, 2003; Scribner, 2004). Others have questioned 
the extent to which public support has permitted courts to challenge the executives 
(Staton, 2010; Vanberg, 2005). Focusing on the importance of institutional factors, 
other scholars accounted for whether institutional factors such as judicial reforms or 
constitutional designs affect the ability of courts to act independently of the executive 
(Domingo, 2000; Brinks, 2005; Ríos-Figueroa, 2006). 
Third, in line with the increasing attention to comparative judicial politics and 
the fact that there is a great deal of variation in the independence of the courts across 
countries and across time, a number of scholars have turned to the question of ‘Why do 
the executives delegate power to courts and tend to maintain it?’. As Hirschl (2004: 49) 
argues, “Judicial power does not fall from the sky; it is politically constructed.” Hence 
the empowerment of courts is understood as a calculated move by political elites to 
secure their interests against the emerging counter elites. Introducing the insurance 
theory a group of scholars argued that political elites who are confronted with electoral 
uncertainty and foresee themselves being ousted from power are more prone to arrange 
a constitutional bargain in which they empower courts as a means of protecting and 
pursuing their agenda after their political removal (Ginsburg, 2003; Finkel, 2008; 
Magalhaes, 1999).  Hirschl (2004) proposed a similar elite-driven theory of hegemonic 
preservation in which political elites believe their interests are more likely to be served 
by independent judiciary with compatible elite views than normal democratic processes 
that favor the people.  
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Fourth, usually couched in terms of the judicialization of politics (Tate and 
Vallinder, 1995) another group of scholars has tried to find out the causes and 
consequences of the process where courts are being increasingly drawn into political 
debates (Stone Sweet, 2000; Guarnieri and Pederzoli, 2002; Dotan and Hofnung, 2005; 
Gauri and Brinks, 2008). The judicialization of politics has been defined as a process 
by which “courts and judges come to make or increasingly dominate the making of 
public policies that had previously been made by other governmental agencies” 
(Vallinder, 1995: 13). As a result, the pursuit of politics through the “medium of legal 
discourse” appears as the central aspect of a judicialization process (Shapiro and Stone-
Sweet, 2002). 
 
 
 
1.2 Overview of the Dissertation 
 
 
 
Following the recent developments in the field of judicial politics this 
dissertation starts by constructing a general model that accounts for the incentives of 
the incumbent governments in maintaining judicial independence. Conducting a cross-
country analysis I show that under similar political conditions the incumbent 
governments in advanced and developing democracies adopt different incentives in 
maintaining the independence of the judiciary. Cross-country analyses and the 
international indicators used in these types of analyses are not without their 
weaknesses. Thus, to better determine the influence of political factors on the 
independence of the judiciary, I continue my analysis by focusing on a single 
developing democracy. Taking Turkey as a case study, I try to account for whether the 
government structure influences the courts’ invalidation of laws and whether this 
impact changes across certain case level characteristics. Finally, focusing on the same 
developing democracy, Turkey, I seek to explain why the opposition political parties 
frequently bring cases in front of the constitutional court and choose to judicialize 
politics although the judiciary is not fully independent. 
In Chapter 2, I test the insurance logic of judicial independence and explain 
whether the explanatory power of political competition on judicial independence varies 
across advanced and developing democracies. Attributing high levels of judicial 
independence to intense political competition, the advocates of this theory envision a 
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positively-sloped relationship between these two aspects. But, do high levels of 
political competition have similar impact in both advanced and developing 
democracies? In particular, in developing democracies –which are characterized by 
high levels of corruption, weak party systems and high electoral volatility- the 
immediate short-term benefits that incumbents may obtain from creating a politically 
dependent judiciary may be higher than the long-term benefits that incumbents may 
reap from supporting the existence of an independent judiciary. Hence, in developing 
democracies where political competition is highly intense, the incumbents may be more 
inclined to create a politically dependent judiciary as a mechanism that increases the 
probability of remaining in office. Accordingly, in the context of developing 
democracies high levels of political competition may not generate as powerful control 
mechanisms as it generates in advanced democracies but may even hamper the judicial 
independence.  
Based on a large-N cross-country statistical analysis over 97 democratic 
countries, this chapter shows that as democratic quality across countries changes, the 
impact of political competition on judicial independence changes as well. The empirical 
findings reveal that while in advanced democracies high levels of political competition 
enhance judicial independence, in developing democracies political competition 
significantly hampers and even negatively affects the independence of the courts. In 
other words, in developing democracies high levels of political competition may boost 
uncertainty and incumbents’ fear about the results of the next election. Hence, in the 
countries with very low levels of democratization whose political environment is very 
competitive the ruling political parties may exert higher pressure on courts in order to 
avoid power alteration.  
In Chapter 3, I investigate how a variety of case-level characteristics (origins of 
the law under review, identity of the litigant, and the constitutional ground on which 
the litigant brings the case) influence the relationship between the government structure 
and the judicial invalidation of laws. The proponents of separation-of-powers approach 
have examined a limited set of political contexts under which the judges may be 
constrained and adopt strategic behavior (Epstein and Knight, 1998; Spiller and Gely, 
1992; Bergara et al., 2003). Yet these scholars have not mentioned whether and to what 
extent the explanatory power of these political factors changes across cases. I assume 
that cases provide justices with different contexts and situations, which in turn interact 
with their perception of external political impacts and hence shape their decisions. 
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Because situational characteristics across cases can trigger different motivations and 
considerations, the importance that the court gives to a possible reaction from the 
political branches are expected to vary across cases. Hence, the goal of Chapter 3 is to 
explain variation in the relationship between government structure and the court’s 
invalidation of laws across cases and account for how certain case-level factors 
influence the degree of the court’s strategic voting. 
I analyze the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decisions taken between the 1984-
2010 periods. Using this dataset and taking the behavior of the court as a whole, I 
examine to what extent the impact of the government structure on the court’s decisions 
is shaped by the varying situations that confront the court from case to case. This 
research both helps to fill a substantial gap in our understanding of the judicial review 
conducted by the Turkish Constitutional Court and shows to what extent the impact of 
political factors on judicial decision-making changes across cases in the context of 
parliamentary democracies.  
Chapter 4 aims to explore why and when the opposition political actors 
frequently turn to the judiciary instead of using political channels in their efforts to 
affect public policies. Assuming that opposition parties are rational actors who tend to 
use litigation as a tool to achieve their political objectives, I hypothesize and find that 
the approaching time of the national election would affect the frequency of the main 
opposition party’s referrals to the Court. Furthermore, this effect is hypothesized to be 
conditioned on the opposition party’s prediction of the upcoming general election 
results. The preceding local election results are used as a proxy measure for the 
opposition party’s prediction and the empirical results show that once the opposition 
party believes that it will lose the upcoming general election, it will begin facing 
incentives to increase its referrals to the constitutional court. I refer to this phenomenon 
as “strategic litigation theory”.  
The strategic litigation theory and evidence is derived from Turkey. I 
constructed an original data set including all the acts promulgated by the parliament 
between the years 1984 and 2011, and analyzed all the cases which are brought to the 
Turkish Constitutional Court by the opposition parties in the same time period. 
Building on an original data, this study also integrates the Turkish Constitutional Court 
– which is understudied to this point - into the large body of existing research in 
comparative political institutions and judicialization of politics.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE ACROSS DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: 
UNDERSTANDING THE VARYING IMPACT OF POLITICAL 
COMPETITION 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
A judiciary that is insulated from legislative and executive influence as well as 
from other private interests is not only the fundamental principle of the rule of law but 
also the central precondition for good governance and consolidation of democracy. 
Independent courts serve as an effective mechanism of accountability that controls and 
constrains the operations and power of the legislature and executive. Independent 
judges, for instance, have the power to punish political authorities who abuse or misuse 
their position. On the other hand, through judicial review independent courts can 
declare legislative acts or government policies unconstitutional. Being insulated from 
electoral accountability and other political interferences, an independent judiciary may 
also produce counter-majoritarian decisions. But then why do the elected 
representatives of democratic countries construct an independent judiciary in the first 
place and try to maintain it even when the courts do not render decisions in conformity 
with their interests or policies? 
According to the insurance logic of judicial independence, politicians facing the 
possibility of losing power seek to limit their opponents by supporting judicial 
independence. This logic posits that the ruling elites, who expect to fall into minority 
status after elections, might want to strengthen the courts in order to protect their own 
rights and liberties once they become political minorities (Ginsburg, 2003). In other 
words, the advocates of the insurance theory emphasize that in the long-run the 
incumbents may have long-term benefits under an independently performing judicial 
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system. Independent courts are perceived by these incumbents as a mechanism that 
would protect them from the opposition’s attack after future electoral change 
(Ginsburg, 2003; Finkel, 2008) or ensure that legally enacted policies continue to be 
implemented even after they leave office (Landes and Posner, 1975). As a result, the 
proponents of the insurance theory argue that politicians offer independent courts when 
political competition is intense and incumbents’ expectation of winning the future 
elections is low (Ramseyer, 1994; Ginsburg, 2003; Finkel, 2008; Landes and Posner, 
1975; Stephenson, 2003). Thus, attributing high levels of judicial independence to 
intense political competition, the advocates of this theory appear to envision a positive 
relationship between these two aspects. 
Although the underlying logic of the insurance theory is quite appealing, it does 
not explain why we do not see high levels of judicial independence in all democratic 
countries with high levels of electoral competition. I argue that the cost-benefit analysis 
that the rational political elites have to undertake while choosing their judicial policies 
would reflect different trends across advanced and developing democracies. Hence 
intense political competition would not inevitably lead to high levels of judicial 
independence across all democratic countries. Thus we should not expect a similar 
impact of political competition both in advanced and developing democracies.   
By advanced democracies I mean regimes where democratic values are fully 
consolidated and political processes are successfully institutionalized. In these types of 
regimes democracy and its rules are perceived to be “the only game in town” (Linz and 
Stepan, 1996). Citizens and leaders conclude that no alternative form of regime has 
subjective validity. The party system is stable and the political parties have strong 
networks of grassroots organizations. Democratic values are highly internalized by the 
citizens. Individual rights and civil liberties are protected by the rule of law. 
Developing democracies, however, are regimes that meet the procedural minima for 
democracy but lack consolidation of democratic values and institutionalization of 
political processes. The weakness in protecting individual rights and civil liberties 
makes opposition difficult. Media is often controlled by the state and strongly supports 
the regime. The party system is underdeveloped and volatile. With high volatility, the 
entry barriers to new parties are lower, and the likelihood that personalistic politicians 
can become the head of government is much higher (Minwaring and Zoco, 2007).  
In line with these differences between advanced and developing democracies, it 
seems logical to presume that the cost-benefit analysis that incumbents engage in when 
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they decide whether to offer independent courts or not, might be different. Especially in 
developing democracies - which are characterized by high levels of corruption, weak 
party systems and high electoral volatility- the immediate short-term benefits that 
incumbents may obtain from interfering in judicial decisions may be higher than the 
long-term benefits that incumbents may reap from high levels of judicial independence. 
Given the fact that in developing democracies citizens have lower levels of confidence 
in the judiciary; the media is highly controlled by the government; citizens have limited 
awareness and willingness to participate in politics; and the political and civil rights of 
the citizens are not efficiently institutionalized, the power holders may be less fearful of 
public reaction than their associates in advanced democracies. This situation may lower 
the costs of the intrusive behaviors for the politicians who aim to offer a dependent 
judiciary. Hence, in the context of developing democracies when political competition 
is highly intense, the incumbents may be more inclined to interfere in judicial decision-
making.  
This chapter does not present political competition as the only factor and 
insurance logic as the only mechanism that accounts for high levels of judicial 
independence. It acknowledges that there are many contextual and institutional factors 
that account for high levels of judicial independence
1
. Yet the main objective of this 
chapter is to test the insurance logic of judicial independence and albeit indirectly show 
whether - and if so how- the impact of political competition on judicial independence 
changes across advanced and developing democracies. I suggest that while in advanced 
democracies political competition has positive impact on judicial independence, in 
developing democracies it has negative impact. In this regard, I develop an empirical 
model and test it across 97 democratic countries.  
The article proceeds as follows: the first part of the study gives the theoretical 
framework about the varying relationship between political competition and judicial 
independence across advanced and developing democracies. The second part introduces 
                                                          
1
 In addition to the notion of insurance logic, in the literature there are other 
explanations about why the politicians maintain an independent judiciary. In this regard 
some scholars perceive the judiciary as a mechanism which is able to enforce 
legislative deals (Carrubba, 2009), monitor lower level bureaucrats (McCubbins and 
Shwartz, 1984; Moustafa, 2007), allow politicians to avoid blame (Salzberger 1993; 
Whittington, 1999; Magaloni, 2008), provide legislatures with valuable information 
about legislation (Rogers, 2001), and ensure that the state promises to respect 
individual rights which in turn would breed foreign investment (North and Weingast, 
1989). 
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the data, key variables and the empirical model. The third part is the empirical section 
where the main hypothesis is tested and results presented. The last part will conclude 
the study by discussing both theoretical and practical implications of the findings. 
 
 
 
2.2 Political Competition and Judicial Independence: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
Although the literature on judicial independence is characterized by various 
conceptual debates about the meaning of judicial independence
2
, a judge is independent 
when, “…she does not face undue external or internal pressure (as say from 
hierarchical superiors) to resolve cases in particular ways” (Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 
2009: 12). On this account, a judge is independent when she can take decisions based 
on her own preferences and interpretation of law. Thus, judicial independence refers to 
independence of the judicial system from external political, economic and social 
influence, and to the ability of individual judges to make independent decisions based 
on their own interpretation of law. In line with this meaning of judicial independence, 
two of its characteristics are evident. The first is “impartiality” and refers to the idea 
that judges will base their decisions on law and facts (Shapiro, 1981). A second trait of 
independence is “political insularity” (Fiss, 1993) and refers to the condition that 
judges should be protected from political interference that might affect their 
impartiality. While identifying judicial independence, one should recall that the courts 
do not operate in vacuum. A number of exogenous factors will influence the judges’ 
opinions and will have varying impacts on their impartiality and insularity (Larkins, 
1996). Although constitutional protections are presented as critical determinants of 
judicial independence, the independent performance of the courts cannot be achieved 
unless politicians and political factors construct the appropriate context. 
One of the central debates in judicial politics literature is about whether - and if 
so how- the political institutions constrain the judicial decision-making. In this regard, 
a vast body of literature focuses on the relationship between political competition and 
judicial independence. While the proponents of the insurance theory focus on the 
                                                          
2
For a discussion of the meaning of juidicial independence, see Burbank and Friedman, 
2002; Larkins, 1996; and Rios-Figueroa, 2006. 
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relationship between the politicians and the courts from the political decision-making 
perspective -which aims to understand the politicians’ calculations and decisions to 
maintain judicial independence-, another strand of research focuses on the same 
relationship from the judicial decision-making perspective (see Marks, 1989; Ferejohn 
and Weingast, 1992; Gely and Spiller, 1992; Epstein and Knight, 1998). Formulating 
their analyses through separation-of-powers models, the basic idea of the latter group of 
studies suggests that the concentration of political power across the branches of 
government forces judges to behave strategically in order to avoid having their 
decisions overturned or to prevent some political sanctions. In line with this logic, some 
scholars designate political fragmentation as a proxy for political competition and 
assert that when political power is highly fragmented the judiciary would be more 
independent
3
 (Chavez, 2004; Harvey and Friedman, 2006; Rios-Figueroa, 2007; 
Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi, 2002).  
Nevertheless, political fragmentation is just one of the mechanisms through 
which political competition affects the performance of the courts. The basic feature of 
this mechanism entails that political fragmentation reduces the capability of incumbents 
to interfere in judicial decision-making because the dispersion of power makes it more 
difficult to obtain the political support to curtail the autonomy of judges. Although 
political fragmentation or high number of veto players/sanctioning players may help to 
control and constrain the incumbents’ intervention in the judiciary, the real 
independence cannot be achieved without a real intention among the political elites. In 
this regard, electoral competition appears as another key mechanism through which 
political competition affects the incumbent politicians’ preferences for maintaining 
judicial independence.  
Under a democratic regime the ruling government can only maintain its power 
through re-election, but intense electoral competition increases the probability of losing 
its office. Hence, the extent of competition between politicians affects the policy 
choices of the incumbents. According to one strand of research, respecting the 
independence of the courts may increase the politicians’ expected payoff. This logic 
has led some scholars to think of judicial independence as a form of political insurance 
that incumbents buy to reduce the cost of being out of office. Thus political insurance is 
                                                          
3
 Assuming that judges have different policy preferences from the government’s, the 
expectation is that in environments where political power is fragmented the judges 
would cast their true preferences. 
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perceived by the incumbents as protection from the opposition’s attack or preservation 
of policy stability after future electoral change. And several scholars have accounted 
for the maintenance and efficacy of judicial institutions as functions of the parties’ 
prospective share of power. 
Ginsburg (2003), for instance, argues that when political incumbents expect to 
win future elections, they have little incentive to empower the judiciary. However, 
when political competition is intense and the incumbents have low expectation of 
retaining their positions, they are more likely to support an independent judiciary 
through which they will be able to challenge the policies of the incoming government. 
Extending Ginsburg’s thesis to Mexico, Finkel (2008) contends that the 1994 judicial 
reform in Mexico, with its introduction of new judicial review powers and 
independence guarantees, was motivated by the ruling party’s fear of losing power. 
Thus, political incumbents delegated power to courts to preserve their rights in case 
they were to later become the opposition. This argument foresees political incumbents 
who will give up current opportunities to attack opponents through the courts in 
exchange for insurance that they will not be attacked once they find themselves in the 
opposition. This logic necessitates high levels of trust between the political actors. 
However especially in developing democracies which are characterized by deep-
mistrust among political actors, the credibility of this commitment would attenuate 
(Popova, 2010).  
According to Landes and Posner (1975), on the other hand, independent courts 
are likely to ensure that legally enacted policies continue to be implemented even after 
the politicians who put them in place leave the office. The scholars argue that 
incumbent politicians who pressure the courts will not be able to attract interest groups 
to support their policy proposals because interest groups would know that the policy 
will not endure after those politicians leave the office. Yet assuming that interest groups 
would value long-term policy stability over short term benefits of short lived policies is 
proved to be empirically wrong in the context of developing democracies (Hellman, 
1998). 
Adopting a similar logic to Landes and Posner (1975), Ramseyer (1994) argues 
that by appointing judges who are ideologically close to them, the incumbent 
politicians increase the probability that when they are out of office these friendly judges 
will prevent future incumbents from completely scrapping existing policies. In 
Ramseyer’s account, the main objective of the incumbent politicians is ensuring policy 
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stability and enlarging their influence during periods when they are out of power. Yet, 
all this they do, at the cost of decreasing their influence over policy while in power. In 
this regard Ramseyer (1994: 742) says “… because politicians will have to run the 
country with independent judges that their predecessors appointed, they will necessarily 
have less impact over policy while in office.” This argument assumes that incumbent 
politicians would value future policy stability and they would expect to be in politics 
for a long time. Yet, especially in developing democracies, where the rule of the game 
is not fully established, the incumbent politicians may not care about future. Thus they 
may not prefer to sacrifice their current policy control in order to increase their future 
policy control.  
Finally, including forward-looking politicians as a necessary condition for inter-
temporal calculus, Stephenson (2003) offers a formal model of the mechanism 
presented by Ramseyer (1994) and finds empirical support for his prediction.  Focusing 
on 159 countries he argues that judicial independence is sustainable only when the 
political system is competitive and contends that political parties find judicial 
independence less attractive as they do not fear of losing the next election.  
 As a result, the insurance theory suggests that the long-term benefits that the 
incumbents expect to reap from an independent judiciary is either an insurance that 
they will not become the subject of harassment once they find themselves in opposition 
or the protection of their policies even after they leave office. Although the underlying 
logic of the insurance theory is quite appealing, it does not explain what happens when 
a hostile government confronts a newly empowered court. Why would incumbents 
believe that the next government will continue to support the independence of a 
judiciary? The insurance theory assumes that the incumbents make an inter-temporal 
calculus and expect to be in politics for a long time to credibly commit to such an 
arrangement. But especially in the context of newly democratized countries the deep 
seated mistrust among the politicians would undermine the credibility of this 
commitment. Thus, while the proponents of the insurance theory emphasize the long-
term benefits of an independent judiciary, they seem to neglect the short-term benefits 
of providing a subservient judiciary. In other words, under certain conditions the 
incumbents might not give up current opportunities to harass opponents through the 
courts in exchange for the long–term benefits of an independent judiciary. For that 
reason, a closer scrutiny of the politicians’ cost-benefit calculations in offering 
subservient courts would provide a theoretical explanation about whether – and if so, 
14 
 
why – the impact of political competition on judicial independence may change across 
advanced and developing democracies.  
 
 
 
2.2.1 The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Pressuring the Judiciary 
 
 
The politicians’ immediate consideration usually hinges on the upcoming 
election so that they tend to make decisions that will bear fruits in the coming elections. 
In this regard, when political competition is intense, the outgoing incumbent - current 
government that faces a high probability of being replaced in the upcoming elections - 
can reap immediate benefits from interfering in the judiciary. The major benefit of a 
subservient judiciary would be its aptitude to increase the incumbent government’s 
probability of remaining in office. In other words, a subservient judicial system can 
help the incumbent government to maximize its chance of re-election by weakening the 
social credibility, financial and even legal standing of the opposition parties.  
Especially in the context of developing democracies where political parties lack 
well-developed grassroots organizations and stable financing, a few court decisions can 
cause considerable damage. Through one single trial a court can undercut a party’s 
campaign budget and close down a party’s newspaper that will have negative impact on 
that party’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, in the context of advanced democracies the same 
court decision might have a smaller effect on established parties that have a strong 
network of grassroots organizations to energize their base (Popova, 2010). Moreover, 
many parties in developing democracies are used only as vehicles for their leaders to 
participate in elections. Thus, a court decision to remove the party leader from the 
ballot could destroy the whole party (Popova, 2010). In some developing democracies 
such as Turkey, the Constitutional Court may also frequently close down political 
parties, ban their members from political participation or cut their budget to an extent 
that would directly affect their very existence.
4
 Yet, in the context of advanced 
democracies where personalistic parties are not the common trend and where the 
political processes are fully institutionalized these kinds of judicial decisions would not 
generate the same impact. Thus, in the context of developing democracies the 
                                                          
4
 Only in the 2000s the Turkish Constitutional Court closed down three political parties  
(Virtue Party (FP) in 2001, the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) in 2003, and the 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) in 2009).      
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immediate short-term benefits that incumbents can obtain from offering a politically 
dependent judiciary may be higher than the long-term benefits that power holders may 
reap from supporting the independent performance of a judiciary. 
Under highly competitive political environment, while an incumbent 
government tries to decide between the long-term or short-term benefits of dependent 
courts, it should also take into consideration the corresponding costs very carefully. 
Rebolledo and Rosenbluth (2010), for instance, emphasize that in the countries with a 
relatively short experience with democracy, voters have only weak incentives to 
monitor politicians and to punish them at the polls for irregular political actions. Thus it 
will not be wrong to argue that the costs of pressuring the judiciary are closely related 
to the overall democratic structure of the society. 
The major potential cost that an incumbent government would have to deal with 
due to its interference in the judiciary is public backlash. Thus if incumbent politicians 
expect that a strong public reaction would follow any attempt to pressure the judiciary, 
they will refrain such actions. Especially as political competition increases the 
incumbent politicians would be more sensitive to public backlash. But in order for the 
citizens to efficiently hold the officials, who intervene in the judiciary accountable, the 
electorate 1) has to be informed about the wrongdoings of the incumbents and able to 
discern the executive’s attempts at interfering in the judiciary 2) has to have high levels 
of confidence in the judiciary and 3) has to be capable and willing to punish the 
incumbent. 
In order for a public enforcement mechanism to work the conflicts the courts 
resolve and the relationship between the courts and political actors must be sufficiently 
transparent (Vanberg, 2005). As an individual becomes better informed about the 
political processes, and her/his interest in such processes increases s/he forms better 
informed preferences and attitudes. The more informed the individual the more likely 
that s/he will understand how the political process works and this increased knowledge 
about the system is expected to generate stronger attitudes about the independence of 
the judicial system. In this sense, an independent and free media is the most crucial 
mechanism that would help to provide transparency and increase the public awareness. 
Yet, one should recall that in developing democracies media is largely controlled by the 
government and is itself an object of attack (Simon, 2004). In some developing 
democracies media is also almost inexperienced in investigative journalism (Waisbord, 
2002). Because of all these reasons in the context of developing democracies the level 
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of transparency is low and this aspect decreases the public awareness of the 
wrongdoings of the incumbent politicians. 
A strong public belief in the courts’ legitimacy is another important factor that 
will make incumbents perceive public backlash as a credible threat. Many scholars 
have pointed out judicial legitimacy as the key for an independent and powerful 
judiciary (e.g. Caldeira, 1986; Gibson, 1989; Gibson et al., 1998; Murphy and 
Tanenhaus, 1990). Accordingly, Staton (2010:13) argues that: “If we continue to 
assume that public preferences constitute the primary incentive for political action in 
the elected branches, then we can conclude that the public will influence the choice to 
respect judicial decisions.” In this regard, if the electorate has low confidence in the 
judiciary, it may tolerate the political interference and the judges will lack the leverage 
to exercise authority. In contrast, if the electorate is unwilling to accept any interference 
in the judiciary, the judges will have the leverage to influence policy outcomes 
effectively (Carrubba 2003; Stephenson 2004). Yet, does public confidence in the 
judiciary changes across advanced and developing democracies? Looking at the public 
confidence in the justice system across 49 countries, a recent study finds that in 
advanced democracies the confidence in the judiciary is higher than the confidence 
levels in developing democracies
5
 (Aydın and Şekercioğlu, 2010). Hence, in 
developing democracies where the society does not hold strong confidence in the 
judiciary, an incumbent’s attempt to create subservient courts may not lead to 
considerable public backlash.  
Finally, one should recall that incumbents would perceive public backlash as a 
credible threat only when the citizens are capable and willing to punish the politicians 
who attempt to pressure the judiciary. Yet, having enduring memories inherited from 
their countries’ previous authoritarian regime, the people living in developing 
democracies are usually accustomed to political interference in judicial affairs. The 
incumbents still have access to the mechanisms for pressuring the judiciary because it 
is quite difficult to root out these types of informal channels (Solon and Foglesong, 
2000). The existence of these informal channels and memories of political intervention 
in the judiciary lowers the cost of implementing an attack on judicial independence. A 
                                                          
5
 Using the World Values Survey which asks the respondents how confident they are in 
the justice system (1=not at all; 4= gret deal) and the Freedom House democracy status 
categories, the authors find that the mean confidence in the judiciary in Free countries 
is 1.53 / 4, in Partly-Free countries it is 1.31 /4 and in the Not-Free category the mean 
confidence is 1.14 / 4. 
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good example for this discussion might be Argentina under the Presidency of Menem. 
After a peaceful transfer of power at the end of a competitive election, the Menem 
administration publicly stated that a judiciary that was able to resist Menem’s economic 
reforms would ruin any chance for economic recovery (Larkins, 1996). So, Menem 
turned his attention to pacifying the Court. When questioned why he was not trying to 
improve the judiciary’s capacity to protect the rule of law, Menem responded: “Why 
should I be the only president in fifty years who hasn’t had his own court?” (Walker, 
2006: 784).  
A society’s strong commitment to individual freedom and protection of liberal 
rights would also affect the individuals’ willingness to punish the political elites who 
would intervene in the judicial decision-making. Moreover, high levels of political 
participation and interest in politics indicate a higher engagement with the political 
system, a better understanding of the political processes and a higher motivation and/or 
ability to evaluate the system. Contrarily, the lack of these democratic values would not 
only lower the willingness of the citizens to punish the incumbents who intervene in the 
judiciary but would also lower the legitimacy of the justice system.
6
 Hence, in 
developing democracies where the society does not hold strong democratic values, an 
incumbent’s attempt to create subservient courts may not lead to considerable public 
backlash.  
For all of these reasons, in developing democracies the incumbents, who decide 
to pressure the judiciary, may have less fear of a public backlash compared to their 
counterparts in advanced democracies. Contrary to the insurance theory that envisions 
the benefits of judicial independence would outweigh the related costs; in the context of 
developing democracies the benefits of subservient courts may outweigh the related 
costs. In a simplified manner, the logic of the argument can be illustrated by the 
following specific examples. 
Consider for example, Pakistan, wherein a number of opposition parties called 
for the resignation of President Musharraf to ensure free and fair elections. In October 
2007, however, Pakistan’s Electoral College re-elected Musharraf to a new five-year 
                                                          
6
 A group of scholars argue that individuals express greater confidence in judiciaries if 
they participate more frequently in the political system (Caldeira, 1986). Moreover, it is 
asserted that public support toward the judiciary is embedded within a larger set of 
relatively stable democratic values. On this account, individuals with higher 
commitments to individual freedom and other democratic values are observed to give 
higher support to the Supreme Courts (Gibson et al., 1998). 
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term in a controversial vote that many called unconstitutional. The interesting turning 
point in this sequence of events is the fact that five months before this flaw re-election, 
Musharraf had dismissed the country’s Chief Justice (Washington Post, 21 February 
2008). Since in its recent history the Supreme Court’s rulings damaged Musharraf’s 
standing and credibility, it can be said that he tried to restore the public support by 
attempting to create a subservient court. Moreover, the powerful criticisms from the 
opposition parties signaled an imminent threat for Musharraf who decided to use 
whatever tools were available, including judicial manipulation, to stay in office. As a 
result, the case of Pakistan shows that in a developing democracy – which is 
characterized by political crises, institutional weakness and where two-thirds of the 
public is unable to provide a meaning for the term “democracy”7 – intensified political 
competition would lead the incumbent leader to curtail the independence of the 
judiciary in order to use it as a tool to remain in power.  
Ecuador can be given as another example in this regard. In 2004, a group of 
opposition deputies signed a petition to create a committee in order to investigate 
certain charges against the President Gutierrez who was accused of corruption. 
However, the impeachment trial request against the President was unsuccessful. After 
this incidence, claiming that the Supreme Court was loyal to his political opponents, the 
President Gutiérrez and his congressional allies dismissed 27 of the Supreme Court’s 
31 judges and replaced them with their own political allies (BBC News, 9 December 
2004). The interesting turning point in this sequence of events is the public rioting that 
started after the new Supreme Court justices dropped corruption charges against two 
former presidents. After those riots the Ecuadorian Congress ousted President Gutierrez 
(BBC News, 17 February 2005). The President was arrested and detained on charges of 
endangering national security but he was released in 2006 after a judge dismissed the 
charges.  Yet, the judicial independence in Ecuador is still under siege
8
. As a result, the 
                                                          
7
CRS Report for Congress (2008) “Pakistan’s Elections: Results and Implications for 
U.S Policy” p.2, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/104699.pdf  (accessed 
February 12, 2011) 
8
 This situation can be explained by two important factors. First, the political 
incumbents in Ecuador still have access to the mechanisms for pressuring the judiciary 
because it is quite difficult to root out these types of channels. Second, the public is 
used to political intervention in the judiciary so that one might argue that public 
backlash is not a credible threat for the incumbents’ intervention attempts. Although in 
2005 a number of public protests broke out against the President’s interference in the 
judiciary, in order to prevent a similar public backlash and take the public awareness 
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Ecuadorian case reveals three important aspects that characterize the relationship 
between the courts and political actors in the context of developing democracies. First, 
in these types of democracies the incumbents perceive the creation of a subservient 
court as an important mechanism to remain in power and fight with corruption charges. 
Second, given that the Ecuadorian society has not fully consolidated the key values of 
democracy
9
, in his cost-benefit calculation in pressuring the judiciary the President 
Gutierrez does not appear to perceive the public backlash as a credible threat. Third, the 
public protests which were sparked by the President to restructure the Supreme Court 
and were successful at ousting the President showed that the public backlash can be an 
efficient and credible control and constrain mechanism.  
As a result, I suggest that the impact of political competition on judicial 
independence changes across advanced and developing democracies. And the main 
hypothesis to be tested is:    
 
Hypothesis: While in advanced democracies political competition has a positive 
impact on judicial independence, in developing democracies it has a negative 
impact.   
 
In the case of the main hypothesis being verified, it would be safe to conclude that in 
the context of developing democracies as political competition increases, the incumbent 
governments tend to manipulate the judiciary and use it as a mechanism for re-election. 
At this point assuming that political competition has similar impacts on judicial 
independence across all types of democracies would be quite misleading. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
under control, the President Correa who was elected in 2007 has created a state 
dependent media. For instance, the Press Freedom Index that is published annually by 
the Reporters without Borders Organization shows that while Ecuador was 67
th
 out of 
178 countries (in 2004) it is 102
nd   
(in 2010). 
9
 For instance, the Latinobarometer Public Opinion Survey conducted in 2004 shows 
that 58.4% of the respondents think that discussing political issues would hurt 
democracy;  only 21.8% of the respondents talk about politics in their daily lives and 
around 66.4% of the respondents would never sign petition or attend authorized 
demonstrations. 
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2.3 Data, Measurement and Model 
 
 
 
There are many aspects emphasized by the scholars as possible determinants of 
judicial independence. These aspects range from institutional characteristics of the 
judiciary to the external environment (political, economic and social) within which it 
operates. Yet by focusing on the impact of political competition, this study extends on 
only one of the explanations of judicial independence. Controlling for other possible 
determinants, in this section I develop and test an empirical model that, albeit 
indirectly, aims to show whether the impact of political competition changes across 
advanced and developing democracies.  
Suggesting that the effect of political competition on judicial independence is 
mediated by the quality of democratic performance; the current study uses the 2000-
2008 data for 97 democratic countries to test its hypothesis. Following Robert Dahl’s 
(1971) Polyarchy, I consider as democratic the countries in which regimes hold 
elections and the opposition has some chance of winning and taking office. Thus, 
adopting a minimalist definition of democracy
10
 the sample is composed of regimes in 
which the executive and the legislature are both chosen in “contested elections”. Using 
the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) database, I apply this definition to the 
countries which the data indicates that have elected executive and legislative bodies and 
a legislature which is composed of multiple political parties.  
A closer scrutiny of the literature shows that judicial independence is generally 
studied under two main categories: “de jure” and “de facto”. De jure judicial 
independence refers to the institutional guarantees outlined in constitutions and 
contains issues such as the tenure of a judge, the nomination process, and salary 
protections. De facto judicial independence- that is the dependent variable of the 
empirical model - focuses on judicial behavior and tries to discern whether and how the 
formal rules are implemented in practice (see Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009).Yet, 
there is no direct way to measure objectively the level of de facto judicial 
independence. For 134 countries the Global Competitiveness Report provides 
standardized and relatively comprehensive subjective assessment of judicial 
independence. This indicator measures the expert opinion regarding the independence 
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For other examples of minimalist definition of democracy, see Przeworski, Alvarez, 
Cheibub and Limongi (1996).  
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of the judiciary in their own countries through the following question: Is the judiciary 
in your country independent from political influences of members of government, 
citizens, or firms? Countries are coded in a scale ranging from 0 (no-heavily 
influenced) to 10 (yes-entirely independent). Calculating the average judicial 
independence index of each country for the period 2000-2008, judicial independence in 
our sample varies from 0.64 in Venezuela to 9.09 in Denmark. The mean value of 
judicial independence in the sample is 5.04 with a standard deviation of 2.04. Of the 97 
countries 36 had judicial independence under 4, while 33 had values between 4 and 7; 
and only 28 had values above 7.  
In order to test the hypothesis suggesting that the impact of political competition 
on judicial independence changes across advanced and developing democracies, I 
model political competition and the level of democracy as the key independent 
variables of the study.  
 
Political competition: Although political competition could take different forms, the 
most common framework involves electoral competition, in which politicians or parties 
must compete for public support via elections. In order to measure political competition 
a variable that proxies for parties’ subjective assessment of their probability of 
controlling the government is needed. The theoretical framework of this chapter – the 
insurance theory – suggests that political competition generates uncertainty which in 
turn provokes the incumbents to support the creation of an independent judiciary 
(Ginsburg, 2003; Finkel, 2008). Yet, challenging the insurance theory I argue that in 
the context of developing democracies while political competition is intense and the 
incumbent party has lower chance of winning the upcoming election, a subservient 
judicial system can help the incumbent government to maximize its chance of re-
election. In this sense we suggest lower levels of judicial independence while 
competition is intense in the context of developing democracies. For that reason our 
measure of political competition should be able to capture the political uncertainty and 
demand for insurance in both multi-party and two-party systems. For instance one 
might argue that the “effective number of parties”11 measure - which is frequently used 
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The effective number of parties is measured by the following formula   
 
∑   
  
   
⁄ where   equals the percent share of seats in the legislature of the  
   party 
(Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). 
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to measure political competition - correlates with political uncertainty. A smaller 
number of parties in the parliament would indicate a higher chance of each party to 
capture seats in government and this would signify a lower political uncertainty. But 
what the proponents of the insurance theory imply by the notion of political uncertainty 
is the condition where an incumbent party has low chance of winning the upcoming 
election. Thus the “effective number of parties” measure would not capture the political 
uncertainty in a legislature dominated by two equally large parties.  
For all these reasons I measure political competition in terms of the difference 
between the percentage of seats of the winning party or bloc of parties and the 
percentage of seats of the runner up in the legislature. Regardless of the number of 
parties in the legislature, a smaller difference between the seat shares of these two 
parties or blocs of parties would indicate a higher competition and a higher uncertainty 
about the upcoming election results. On the other hand, a higher differential between 
the seat shares, the more certain will be the leading party or bloc that will end up in 
power. This measure thus would also capture the extent to which there is a dominant 
party. But still the presence of electoral competition means that even the most dominant 
and popular party faces a relatively higher chance of losing power than it would under a 
one-party system.  
The data for political competition is drawn from the IFES Election Guide for 
the period 2000-2008. For the reason that there is a direct inverse relationship between 
“the differential between the seat shares” and “political competition” (political 
competition increases as the difference between the seat-shares decreases) I create a 
variable of political competition that takes the inverse value of the difference between 
the seat shares. The measure of political competition is normalized between 0 and 1, 
“0” indicating minimum political competition and “1” referring to maximum political 
competition.
12
 For each country the average political competition for the given time 
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 For instance, if we take the political competition in Moldova during the period 2000-
2008 my calculation is as follows. The total number of seats in the Moldovan 
parliament is 101. In 2000, the leading party holds 40 of the seats and the runner up 
holds 26 of the seats. Thus the differential between the seat shares is: (40-26)/101= 
0.139. With the general election held in 2001 the differential between the seat shares 
becomes (71-19)/101= 0.515. In the general election held in 2005 the differential 
between the seat shares becomes (56-34)/101=0.218.  Hence, the average of the 
differential between the seat shares for the period 2000-2008 is (0.139*1+0.515*4 + 
0.218*4)/9= 0.341. The lower differential between the seat shares refers to a higher 
level of political competition. For that reason I normalize the differential by subtracting 
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period (2000-2008) is calculated. The values of the political competition variable 
ranged from 0.036 to 0.989 with a mean of 0.777 and a standard deviation of 0.199.  
The data was heavily skewed towards the higher end of the scale. Only 13 countries 
had political competition lower than 0.5. For robustness check I also use the political 
competition indicator from the Polity dataset as an alternative measure (see Table 2.2).  
 
Level of democracy: I take the level of democracy as an indicator that differentiates 
between advanced and developing democracies. In other words, “level of democracy” 
refers to a rough categorization of democratic regimes ranging from strong democratic 
regimes where democratic values are fully consolidated and political processes 
successfully institutionalized (advanced democracies) to democratic regimes that meet 
the procedural minima for democracy but lack consolidation of democratic values and 
institutionalization of political processes (developing democracies). The Freedom 
House (FH) measurement scale is used as a tool to operationalize this abstract 
classification of democratic regimes. The FH scale becomes an agreeable tool for 
categorizing democratic countries according to the institutionalization and protection of 
the political rights and civil liberties of citizens.  
The use of the FH measure in the current analysis, however, necessitates careful 
thinking. First, one of the sub-scores of the FH index is the rule of law that in addition 
to other legal protections also measures judicial independence. In this regard, including 
judicial independence in both sides of the equation will create fundamental 
methodological problems and lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. Second, the FH 
index also includes the measure of the electoral process as well as political pluralism 
and participation. Using these measures in the analysis will also lead to 
multicollinearity problem since one of the key independent variables of the model is 
political competition.  Thus, I recalculated the FH index to obtain a democratization 
level index that is exogenous to judicial independence and political competition. I 
excluded the rule of law, electoral process, political pluralism and participation and 
functioning of government sub-scores that are used in calculating the FH index. I 
recalculated the democracy index by summing up each country’s points only on the 
subcategories of Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational 
                                                                                                                                                                         
it from 1. So the political competition measure for Moldova for the period 2000-2008 is 
(1-0.341)=0.659      
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Rights, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. In total each country’s 
democracy point ranges between 14 and 44. Thus having a continuous character the 
recalculated FH index is normalized between 0 and 1. The values for level of 
democracy variable ranged from 0 (Cameroon) to 1(7 countries) with a mean of 0.716 
and standard deviation of 0.247.The data was heavily skewed towards the higher end of 
the scale. For robustness check I also use the World Bank Governance Indicator of 
Accountability and Voice as an alternative measure of democracy level (see Table 2.2).  
 
Control variables: In the empirical model I also explore the robustness of our 
estimates to the inclusion of other potential judicial independence determinants which 
are related to the executive-legislative arrangement, type of the legal system, and the 
constitutional status of courts. 
How might presidentialism and parliamentarism affect judicial independence? 
For instance, Ackerman (1997) suggests that presidentialism is good for courts by 
providing them with a role as an arbitrator among law-making powers. Because of the 
potential for institutional divergences between the executive and the legislative 
branches, it is stated that the presidential systems support judicial activism. Ginsburg 
(2003) argues that these divergent policy views can be ameliorated by the presence of a 
powerful and independent constitutional court. In addition, division of power 
between branches can allow the courts to exercise greater independence in their rulings 
because attacking the court may be more difficult in systems where passage of 
legislation requires the cooperation between two separate political bodies.  On the other 
hand, some scholars argue that a strong president can control the actions of judges 
through acts of coercion. Hayo and Voigt (2007), for instance, observe that presidential 
systems enjoy lower levels of judicial independence compared to parliamentary 
systems. According to this line of thinking strong presidents are more easily able to 
retaliate against the courts for unfavorable decisions. Likewise some scholars show that 
concentrated executive power is a significant factor in explaining judicial subservience 
in the post-communist countries (Herron and Randazzo, 2003). According to this line 
of thinking, strong presidents impose substantial constraints on judicial independence.  
Measuring the relationship between the executive and legislature as a form of 
government, I include executive-legislative arrangement in the empirical model as a 
control variable. Indicating whether a country has a parliamentary, presidential or semi-
presidential regime, the data for executive-legislative arrangement variable is taken 
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from the World Bank Political Institutions database. Parliamentary systems are coded 
as 2, semi-presidential systems are coded as 1 and presidential systems are coded as 0.  
Another system based explanation that is elaborated in the literature as a 
possible determinant of judicial independence is the type of the legal system. In their 
study, La Porta et al. (1998) find that the quality of law enforcement differs across legal 
families. They take “efficiency of the judicial system” provided by the Business 
International Corporation as a proxy for the quality of law enforcement and find that 
countries with common-law tradition have more efficient judicial systems. On the other 
hand, Djankov et al. (2003) empirically demonstrate that legal origin explains about 40 
percent of the variation in legal formalism. In the data for legal system, civil-law legal 
tradition is coded as 0 and common-law legal tradition is coded as 1. In our sample 68 
countries had common-law and 28 had civil-law legal system.  
For an accurate inference about the independence of a judicial system, one 
should also take into consideration the institutional guarantees of the judiciary stated in 
legal texts. In the literature, these guarantees are designated as de jure judicial 
independence and generally comprise issues such as tenure of a judge, nomination 
process, and salary protections (Feld and Voigt, 2003).The degree of institutional 
protections in a given country is assessed by looking at its constitution. I formulate de 
jure judicial independence as an additive index by summing up three variables from the 
Comparative Constitutions Project by Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton in 2007 that 
provides information on the characteristics of written constitutions for 192 countries. 
These variables are judicial independence
13
, judicial review
14
 and protection of judicial 
salary
15
.  The additive index is normalized between 0 and 1. Thus, the countries with 
maximum de jure judicial independence refer to higher levels of constitutional 
guarantees of the judiciary. Finally, to control for the arguments stating that judicial 
independence and political competition are merely the result of having more financial 
resources, I use the natural log of the average per capita gross domestic product for the 
period 2000-2008. I use the data from the World Bank’s World Development 
                                                          
13
It is a binary variable coded 1 if the constitution contains an explicit declaration 
regarding the independence of the central judicial organ(s) and 0 otherwise. 
14
It is a binary variable coded 1 if “any court can review the constitutionality of laws 
and 0 otherwise.  
15
It is a binary variable coded 1 if the constitution explicitly state that judicial salaries 
are protected from governmental intervention and 0 otherwise. 
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Indicators. The ln GDP per capita (corrected for purchasing power parity) has a 
minimum value of 6.48 (Niger) and maximum value of 11.24 (Luxemburg) and a 
standard deviation of 1.22.   
To correct for potential omitted variable bias, all these control variables are 
included in the empirical model. Thus, if the relationship between de facto judicial 
independence and political competition is merely the result of being economically 
developed and having a presidential system with common-law legal tradition, and 
strong constitutional protections for the judiciary then controlling for these variables 
should eliminate the statistical significance of political competition on judicial 
independence. 
 
 
 
2.4 Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
 
 
Although the available data for judicial independence has longitudinal 
character, our key independent variables are time invariant (e.g. level of democracy) 
and rarely changing (e.g. political competition changes with national elections). The 
lack of variation in the level of democracy variable may not constitute a big problem 
since that variable is expected to condition the effect of political competitiveness. Yet 
the bigger problem is the lack of variation in the political competition variable. For this 
reason conducting panel data analysis is not appropriate. Using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression, as is appropriate for continuous dependent variable (Wooldridge, 
2002), I aim to test whether the impact of political competition on judicial 
independence changes across countries with different democratization levels. Yet one 
should bear in mind that, since the empirical analysis does not directly take into 
consideration the changes to judicial independence that follow from changes in political 
competition, the analysis provides an indirect test of the mechanism that is proposed in 
the theoretical section.  
I estimate two interaction models that would help to delineate whether and to 
what extent the impact of political competition on judicial independence changes across 
advanced and developing democracies.  In these models the dependent variable is the 
de facto judicial independence score. In the first model, I include only the variables of 
interest (political competition; democracy level and political competition interacted 
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with democracy level). In the second model, I control for the legal system, executive-
legislative arrangement, de jure judicial independence and the GDP per capita of the 
countries.  
 
Table 2.1: OLS regression on judicial independence index 
 
  Model 1 Model 2  
   
 
Political Competition -8.86*** -5.15**  
 
(2.37) (1.89)  
Democracy Level -1.09 -2.74  
 
(2.56) (2.14)  
Political Competition*Democracy Level 10.92** 8.84**  
 
(3.42) (2.90)  
Legal System  1.89***  
  (0.33)  
Executive-legislative arrangement   0.43**  
  (0.18)  
De jure judicial independence 
 
-0.86  
  
(0.60)  
GDP per capita (ppp)  0.39**  
  (0.19)  
Constant 6.38*** 1.85  
 
(1.60) (2.02)  
 
Observations 97 97 
 
R squared  0.48 0.68  
Prob>F 0.000 0.000  
 
              Note: ***<0.001, **<0.05, * <0.10 
 
Both models presented in Table 2.1 show that the impact of political 
competition on de facto judicial independence reveals significant variation across 
advanced and developing democracies. The coefficient on the interaction term is 
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positive and statistically significant in both models, suggesting that the beneficial effect 
of political competition on judicial independence is greater for countries with very high 
levels of democratization compared to the countries with very low levels of 
democratization. The negative estimate of political competition shows that when the 
democratization level is ‘0” the net impact of political competition on judicial 
independence is significantly negative, whereas when the democratization level is “1” 
the impact of political competition is significantly positive.   
Nevertheless, it is impossible to evaluate the statistical significance of the 
political competition effect simply from reviewing the coefficients and their standard 
errors in Table 2.1 (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). The marginal effect of political 
competition may not have a statistically significant impact on judicial independence 
over the entire range of democracy levels. In other words, the hypothesis tests 
summarized in Table 2.1 for the political competition effect are useful and interpretable 
only when the level of democracy is equal to ‘‘0’’ or “1”. In order to evaluate better the 
statistical and substantive effects of political competition, we require additional 
analysis. Figure 2.1 shows the predicted level of judicial independence across the range 
of political competition for two hypothetical democratic countries. Estimates for the 
hypothetical developing democracy whose level of democratization is set to 0.2 (based 
on the recalculated FH index that ranges between 0 and 1) are represented on a solid 
line. On the other hand, the estimates for the hypothetical advanced democracy whose 
level of democratization is set to 0.9 are represented on a dashed line. Except their 
democratization levels, both countries share the same legal system and executive-
legislative arrangement as well as the same level of de jure judicial independence and 
GDP per capita.
16
 
Note that the solid line slopes downward and reflects the negative effect of 
political competition, whereas the dashed line slopes upward and reflects the positive of 
political competition. Accordingly, for our hypothetical developing democracy, the 
predicted level of judicial independence drops from approximately 6 points to 2 points 
across the range of political competition. On the other hand, for our hypothetical 
advanced democracy the predicted level of judicial independence increases from 
approximately 4 points to 7 points. The distance between the solid line and the dashed 
                                                          
16
 Both countries are presidential democracies with common-law legal systems. They 
have full constitutional protection over their judiciaries (de jure judicial independence 
is set to 1). Their GDP per capita is set to the mean value of the variable.    
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line is precisely the effect the political competition on judicial independence, 
conditional on a democratization level. These estimates are consistent with our 
argument suggesting that while in advanced democracies the political competition has 
positive impact on judicial independence, in developing democracies it hampers 
independence of the courts. Yet we do not know whether the differences are 
statistically distinguishable from zero. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Predicted level of judicial independence 
Note: Shows predicted level of judicial independence across the range of political competition 
 
To better convey how the effect of political competition on judicial 
independence changes across countries with different democratization levels, Figure 
2.2 shows the marginal effect of political competition, with confidence intervals around 
the estimated effect. The graph is run using the estimates from the interaction model 
and the full sample of democratic states. The black line in the figure represents the 
change in judicial independence associated with flipping the political competition 
variable from 0 to 1. The dashed lines surrounding the solid black line indicate the 95 
percent confidence interval around that change. Figure 2.2 shows that the marginal 
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effect of political competition on judicial independence does considerably vary across 
advanced and developing democracies. Indeed the effect of political competition is 
positive and significant for countries with relatively high democratization levels. It 
becomes statistically insignificant as democratization level decreases and especially for 
countries with very low levels of democratization it become statistically significant and 
negative. 
 
Figure 2.2: Marginal effect of political competition 
 
Note: Displays changes in the predicted probability of judicial independence when the political 
competition changes across countries, for all values of democracy level measures. Dashed lines 
reflect the 95% confidence interval around the predicted change. 
 
 
The marginal effect of political competition on judicial independence appears to 
be significantly positive in countries with high democratization levels (between 0.8 and 
1), whereas in countries whose recalculated FH index ranges between 0 and 0.3, the 
effect of political competition on judicial independence is significantly negative. These 
empirical results show that in countries with very low levels of democratization, 
political competition has significantly negative impact on judicial independence. 
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Contrary to the insurance theory that envisions long-term benefits for the 
incumbents in creating independent courts, the intuition behind this empirical finding is 
that, in the context of developing democracies under intensified competitive political 
environment, power holders might have high short-term benefits and low costs in 
creating politically dependent and subservient courts. In line with these empirical 
results, comparing the Russian and Ukrainian courts during the 2002-2003 
parliamentary campaigns, Popova (2010) observes that the Russian politicians had a 
weaker incentive to interfere in judicial decision compared to the Ukranian politicians. 
Indicating that the Ukranian elections were more competitive than the Russian 
elections
17
, the author presents the varying levels of political competition across these 
two countries as the key determinant of the varying levels of judicial independence. As 
a result, Popova (2010) states that in developing democracies, political competition (a) 
increases the benefits to incumbents of dependent courts, (b) fails to increase the costs 
of exerting pressure on the courts, and (c) increases the number of court cases whose 
outcomes matter to incumbents. The incumbents who face stronger competition and a 
higher probability of losing the next election are claimed to be more likely to try to 
control and constrain the judiciary. 
Regarding the explanatory power of control variables, Table 2.1 demonstrates 
that all else equal, the judicial independence in democratic countries with common-law 
legal system is substantially higher compared to the judicial independence levels of 
democracies with civil-law legal origin. This finding is in line with La Porta et al. 
(1998)’s study where they observe that judicial independence is empirically strongly 
associated with common-law legal origin.  
In parliamentary democracies, the executive is an agent of parliament, 
accountable to the majority of the parliament and subject to being ousted at any time by 
vote of no confidence. Yet, in presidential democracies legislature and executive are 
agents of voters and so not accountable to one another (Shugart and Carey, 1992). In 
line with these characteristics of the parliamentary systems, the empirical results 
                                                          
17
 Russian politics seem to be less competitive today than in 2003. For that reason some 
may ask whether Russia can be defined as a democratic regime. One should be cautious 
that in 2005, Freedom House downgraded Russia from a “partially free” regime to the 
“not free” category (Freedom House, 2005). Thus in 2003, the period considered by 
Popova (2010), Russia could still be called a developing democracy. Yet, since this 
study focuses on the period 2000-2008, Russia is not included in our sample of 
democratic regimes.   
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suggest that parliamentary systems are inclined to have higher independent judiciaries 
compared to presidential systems. As regards the impact of political regime on judicial 
independence, the empirical results presented in Table 2.1 show that the independence 
of the judiciary tends to be significantly higher in parliamentary democracies compared 
to the independence levels of the courts in presidential regimes. 
Moreover, Table 2.1 specifies that the constitutional protections of the judiciary 
do not significantly explain a country’s actual judicial independence level. Thus, based 
on our empirical findings one can argue that if a country would include in its 
constitution some legal reservations regarding the independence of the judiciary, such 
institutional protections would not guarantee higher levels of judicial independence. 
This finding is in line with the arguments stated by the scholars who acknowledge that 
actual practices do not always follow the rules (e.g. Chavez, 2004). Thus, on paper 
judges may enjoy formal guarantees of tenure or salary but in practice may face 
removal by the incumbent politicians before the end of their terms (Feld and Voigt, 
2003). Finally, Table 2.1 shows that, all other variables held constant, the countries 
with higher levels of GDP per capita have significantly higher levels of judicial 
independence.    
 
 
 
2.4.1 Sensitivity Tests and Empirical Challenges 
 
 
 Conceptually and methodologically this study distinguishes the level of political 
competition in a country from that country’s level of democracy. In other words, I do 
not undertake high levels of political competition as a characteristic that could be 
ascribed only to advanced democracies. Nonetheless, one may still intuitively argue 
that political competition is closely related to the level of democracy. Thus it is 
important to show to what extent the measures of these two concepts are correlated 
with each other. When I check for the correlation coefficient
18
 between these two 
measures, I find that the sample correlation between political competition and the level 
of democracy is Corr (X, Y) = +0.46. This value of the correlation does not indicate a 
strong relationship between political competition and the level of democracy measures 
used in the current analysis. Recalling the theoretical framework of the empirical 
                                                          
18
 The value of Corr(X,Y) is such that that -1 <Corr(X,Y) < +1.  The + and – signs are 
used for positive  linear correlations and negative linear correlations, respectively. 
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analysis, one should also remember that by the political competition measure my 
purpose is to infer the political uncertainty that refers to the chance of the incumbent 
party to capture seats in the incoming government. In this regard, I believe that it is far 
from obvious why we should expect a strong connection between political uncertainty 
and the level of democracy. 
The fact that the key variables are measured by reputational indices means that 
sensitivity testing is particularly important to see whether the results are robust to 
different operationalizations of the main variables. As a sensitivity test, I conduct the 
same empirical analysis by using different measures of the key independent variables. 
For instance, as an alternative measure of political competition I use the political 
competition indicator used in the Polity dataset. The original values for this measure 
ranges between “0” and “10”. This measure is recalculated so as to vary between “0” 
and “1” so that “1” refers to the highest and “0” refers to the lowest level of political 
competition. On the other hand, as an alternative measure of democracy level, I use the 
World Bank Governance Indicator of Accountability and Voice. This may also be a 
good proxy for democracy level because it aggregates the results of numerous expert 
reputational surveys and captures the perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. In the original dataset the 
Accountability and Voice indicator ranges between -2.5 and +2.5. The measure is 
recalculated so as to change between “0” and “1” so that “1” refers to the highest level 
of democracy. Including the usual controls the empirical models are re-tested by using 
these alternative measures of political competition and democracy level. The empirical 
findings presented in Table 2.2 show that the coefficients of the key variables remain 
statistically significant and maintain the same sign. All these results strongly support 
the hypothesis that political competition has varying impact on judicial independence 
across advanced and developing democracies. But it is important to underline two 
important caveats. First, the dependent variable of this study– de facto judicial 
independence - is derived from subjective evaluations and if these evaluations are 
correlated with other aspects of a country, the results might be biased. Yet, to my 
knowledge there is no better data that provides a direct and objective measure of de 
facto judicial independence in a cross-country setting. 
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Table 2.2: OLS regression on judicial independence index: Robustness check with 
alternative measures for political competition and level of democracy 
    Model 1 Model 2 
   Political Competition -5.50*** -4.49*** 
 
(1.12) (1.02) 
Democracy Level 4.67 1.99 
 
(3.01) (2.59) 
Political Competition*Democracy Level 5.22* 6.38** 
 
(2.99) (2.63) 
De jure judicial independence 
 
-0.01 
  
(0.49) 
Political Regime 
 
0.09 
  
(0.15) 
Legal System 
 
1.57*** 
  
(0.24) 
ln GDP per capita (ppp) 0.65* 
  (0.41) 
Constant 4.07*** 3.56*** 
 
(0.85) (0.76) 
   Observations 94 94 
R squared  0.72 0.82 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
   Note: ***<0.001, **<0.05, * <0.10 
 
 
Second, the key independent variables of the empirical model - political 
competition and the level of democracy - might be endogenous to judicial 
independence. Because of the absence of reliable instrumental variables (which have to 
be correlated with political competition and the level of democracy respectively but not 
judicial independence) I cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causation. 
Nevertheless I believe that it is important to consider the theoretical basis for the 
concern of endogeneity.  
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For instance, one might argue that in the countries where the judiciary is 
insulated from any external interference, the level of democracy would be higher (e.g. 
higher protection of freedom of expression and individual rights).
19
 But one should 
recall that I am not looking to estimate the impact of the level of democracy on judicial 
independence. Instead, my purpose is to measure the impact of political competition on 
judicial independence which is conditioned by the level of democracy. Thus the issue 
that could be problematic is the reverse causality effect of judicial independence on 
political competition. However it is far from obvious why the impact of judicial 
independence on political competition would be stronger in countries with high 
democratization levels. If judicial independence increases the level of political 
competition for whatever reason, one would expect that it would do so similarly in 
advanced and developing democracies. Yet I am aware of no theoretical model that 
explains how this could be so. Thus despite all these caveats of the study, the 
consistency of the empirical results with the predictions of the model increases our 
confidence that the model is accurate. 
 
 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
Assuming that putting pressure on the judiciary is very costly, the proponents of 
the insurance theory present judicial independence as an efficient insurance 
mechanism. They argue that in democratic countries electoral competition functions as 
a sanctioning device through which the electorate is able to replace politicians who 
intervene in the judiciary. Thus, attributing high levels of judicial independence to 
intense political competition, the advocates of this theory appear to envision a positive 
relationship between these two aspects. This chapter, however, empirically shows that 
as democracy level across countries changes the impact of political competition on 
judicial independence changes as well. While in advanced democracies high levels of 
political competition enhance judicial independence, in democracies with very low 
democratization levels, political competition significantly hampers independence of the 
                                                          
19
Some scholars argue that the judiciary is responsible for protecting minority rights 
and securing other procedures associated with liberal government (Larkins, 1996), for 
maintaining the rule of law and ensuring the establishment of consolidated democracy 
(Linz and Stepan, 1996).  
36 
 
courts. In line with these empirical findings, the positive relationship between judicial 
independence and political competition that is suggested by the insurance theorists 
appears not to grasp the situation in developing democracies. At this point assuming 
that political competition has similar impacts on judicial independence across all types 
of democracies would be quite misleading. 
This chapter proposes that the cost-benefit analysis that the rational political 
elites have to undertake while choosing their judicial policies would reflect different 
trends across advanced and developing democracies. For that reason high levels of 
political competition would not inevitably lead to high levels of judicial independence 
across all democratic countries. In the context of advanced democracies, for instance, 
the cost of meddling with judicial decision-making practices would be quite costly for 
the incumbent politicians. In advanced democracies free and independent media 
provides considerable transparency so that the public becomes aware of the 
wrongdoings of the government. In these types of regimes people also have high levels 
of confidence in the judicial system. Moreover they are highly interested in politics, 
have higher education levels and tend to actively participate in political or civic 
activities. Because of all these aspects, in an advanced democracy if an incumbent 
government decides to put pressure on the judiciary and create subservient courts, it 
will probably face fierce public backlash. In other words, the cost of putting pressure on 
the judiciary or meddling with its decision-making practices would be quite costly for 
power holders in these types of regimes. Thus, the incumbent politicians who face the 
challenge of being ousted from power would prefer to secure their long-term interests 
under the insurance of an independent judiciary.  
In developing democracies, however, this chapter suggests that the costs of 
pressuring the courts are lower but the benefits of pressure are higher. In these types of 
regimes as political competition increases, the incumbent governments tend to 
manipulate the judiciary and use it as a mechanism for re-election or protection of 
power. In other words political competition appears to hamper the independent 
performance of the courts. This situation reveals an important dilemma for the 
democratic consolidation efforts in the developing democracies. As long as the public 
does not start to act as a credible control and constrain mechanism in these countries, 
this dilemma would stay irreconcilable and we should not wonder why the majority of 
developing democracies struggle with the rule of law despite electoral competition.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF CASE-LEVEL FACTORS ON STRATEGIC VOTING IN 
TURKEY’S CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
By reviewing laws and decrees under the rubric of constitutionality, 
constitutional courts serve as a control and constrain mechanism against the other 
branches of government. Yet, only in the last two decades the scholars started to 
account for the factors that lead constitutional courts to declare a parliamentary act 
unconstitutional. Especially the European scholars still often perceive courts to be 
“above politics,” and their decisions tend to be treated as purely legal texts that can be 
understood in isolation from their political context (Vanberg, 2001).Whether courts 
exercise judicial review power, however, depends not only on the constitutional rules 
specifying the court’s jurisdiction and function. Accordingly, the approaches that 
account for judicial decision-making often show that judges tend to be guided more by 
policy concerns and less by legal concerns. In this regard one of the most central 
debates in judicial politics literature is about whether or not the political institutions 
constrain the court’s decision-making.  
The separation-of-powers approach, for example, suggests that the courts take 
into consideration the external political constraints because the other two branches, 
executive and legislature, have the power to affect the judiciary. Assuming that judges 
are strategic actors, the proponents of this approach argue that judges’ decisions depend 
on a consideration of the preferences of other political actors, anticipation of reactions 
to their decisions and the institutional context in which they act (Harvey and Friedman, 
2006; Epstein, Knight, and Martin, 2001; Maltzman, Spriggs and Walbeck, 2000; 
Epstein and Knight, 1998; Ferejohn and Shipan, 1990; Eskridge, 1991; Spiller and 
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Gely, 1992; Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992). As a result, all of these studies assume that 
the court has rational foresight and suggest that the court will anticipate the reaction of 
the elected politicians and act strategically
20
. According to the attitudinal approach, on 
the other hand, judges decide cases based solely on their own personal preferences 
(Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Lindquist and Solberg, 2007; Howard and Segal, 2004).  
Although these two approaches appear to be situated in an absolute dichotomy, 
they should not be treated as binary opposites. For instance, as the leading figures of 
the attitudinal approach, Segal and Spaeth (2002:349) say: “One might readily imagine 
a spectrum along which the separation-of-powers model might be relatively true...or 
relatively false…” Similarly, in his previous study Segal (1997) argued that judges may 
or may not be able to vote their sincere preferences, depending on the political 
environment. On the other hand, some scholars who support the strategic account of 
judicial decision-making do not deny the importance of judges’ preferences but 
additionally maintain that under certain conditions other political institutions may 
constrain the judges’ ability to pursue their own preferences. In this regard, Spiller and 
Gely (1992) and Bergara et al. (2003) argue that there are ranges in which the U.S 
Supreme Court is constrained and ranges in which the Court acts independently so that 
the judges are able to impose their own preferences. But these studies seem only to 
account for the political contexts where judges will adopt strategic behavior instead of 
sincere behavior.
21
 They do not mention whether and to what extent the explanatory 
                                                          
20
 Although the literature that treats courts as strategic political actors has focused 
mostly on the U.S. Supreme Court, many scholars have been able to show that the 
courts outside the United States behave strategically as well. Some of these studies 
include applications to executive–judicial relations in Russia (Epstein, Knight and 
Shvetsova, 2001), Argentina (Iaryczower, Spiller and Tomassi, 2002) and post-
communist countries (Herron and Randozzo, 2003). Others focus on strategic behavior 
by Argentinean judges during periods of regime change (Helmke, 2002); account for 
the strategic use of media by the Mexican Supreme Court (Staton, 2010); and explain 
the impact of public monitoring and transparency of the political system on the final 
decision of the German Constitutional Court (Vanberg, 2005). 
21
 Spiller and Gely (1992), for instance, argue that when the courts ideologically based 
preferences are far different from those of relevant members of congress then the court 
will adopt strategic behavior for its decision not to be overturned by the congress. But 
when courts preferences are middle of the road in comparison to those of the congress 
then the court will vote its own preferences. Bergara et al. (2003), on the other hand, 
apply Spiller and Gely’s (1992) model to Segal’s (1997) data and find that although 
judges’ ideologies matter the Court is often, but not always, constrained by the 
Congress. Bergara et al. (2003) maintain that when the Court is constrained by politics, 
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power of political factors on the court’s decisions changes across cases. In other words, 
strategic perspectives have examined a limited set of broad situations under which the 
judges may be constrained, but they did not focus on the situations that may vary from 
case to case.  
The goal of this chapter is to explain the variation in the relationship between 
government structure and the court’s invalidation of laws (hereinafter, “strategic 
voting”) across cases and account for how certain case-level factors influence the 
magnitude of the court’s strategic voting. Cases provide judges with different contexts 
and situations, which in turn interact with their perception of external political impacts 
and hence shape their decisions (Bartels, 2011). Certain case-related characteristics 
may intensify the Court’s invalidation of laws, whereas other characteristics may 
constrain it. A focus on how situational factors can both constrain and enhance strategic 
voting extends strategic perspectives since certain case-level factors can motivate 
judges to act more in line with the external political factors.  
In this study, I examine how a variety of case-level characteristics influence the 
relationship between the government structure and the judicial invalidation of laws with 
a special emphasis on parliamentary systems and the European model of constitutional 
review (Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2002). By means of a data set I constructed for the 
period 1984-2010, I analyze the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decisions. Using this 
original dataset and taking the behavior of the court as a whole, I examine to what 
extent the impact of the government structure on the court’s decisions is shaped by the 
varying situations that confront the court from case to case. My research seeks to fill a 
substantial gap in our understanding of the judicial review conducted by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court and integrate the workings of this Court into the excellent body of 
existing research in comparative political institutions and judicial politics. Furthermore 
this study shows to what extent the impact of political factors on judicial decision-
making changes across cases in the context of parliamentary democracies.  
This chapter proceeds in six stages. The first part reviews some expectations 
about how external political factors affect judicial review based on the existing 
literature. Establishing the theoretical foundation of the linkage between case-level 
factors and strategic voting, the second part presents the hypotheses of the study. The 
                                                                                                                                                                         
judges respond strategically and formulate their actions they consider will face 
potential reactions from the Congress or the President.   
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third part gives a short explanation of the organization and decision-making process of 
the Turkish Constitutional Court and introduces the data. The fourth part describes the 
empirical model that is used to test the hypotheses and discusses the operationalization 
of several key variables. The fifth part is the empirical section where the hypotheses are 
tested and results presented. The last part will conclude the study by discussing both 
theoretical and practical implications of the findings. 
 
 
 
3.2 Political Factors and Judicial Decision-Making 
 
 
 
Under the separation-of-powers system each political branch can impose certain 
limits on the functions of other political actors. For that reason policy does not emanate 
from separate actions of each political branch but from interactions among them 
(Epstein and Knight, 1998). While taking a decision judges, legislators or executives 
take into consideration the institutional constraints, the preferences of other relevant 
actors and their expected behaviors. The judiciary, for instance, may strike down a law 
for violating the constitution but the parliament can pass a new legislation or “punish” 
judges for their decisions. Although the executive and legislature rarely “punish” 
judges for their decisions, even in advanced democracies the elected branches may 
constrain judges since there are several institutional mechanisms that provide the 
judiciary with an incentive to take the preferences and expected actions of other 
political actors into account. 
The Comparative Constitutions data compiled by Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 
(2010) shows that the national constitutions of 129 countries do not explicitly protect 
judicial salaries from governmental intervention. Furthermore, in these countries the 
legislature has considerable discretion concerning the portion of national budget given 
to the judiciary. Altering the size of the constitutional court or the selection and 
removal processes of judges is another sanctioning tool that the elected branches 
possess. For instance, in the Turkish case, with the constitutional amendments adopted 
in 2010, the Turkish Parliament increased the number of judges sitting in the 
constitutional court from 11 to 17. Moreover, while before the 2010 amendments the 
judges of the constitutional court were appointed only by the President, with the new 
amendments three judges will be elected by the Parliament. Impeachment and 
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conviction of a constitutional court judge might be another tool used by the executive 
or legislature. For instance, despite clear constitutional provisions granting federal 
judges life tenure in Argentina, the Supreme Court judges have been removed or 
threatened with removal following every change in government since the 1940s 
(Helmke, 2002). In the case of the United States, on the other hand, although the threat 
of impeachment may seem to have limited credibility because of the legislature's costs 
associated with the process, the most direct congressional power over federal judges is 
impeachment (Cross and Nelson, 2001).   
Finally, one should recall that for an efficient judicial review in democracies, 
the courts’ decisions must be implemented. The implementation of their decisions, 
however, demands a variety of tools and resources that judiciary lacks (Cross and 
Nelson, 2001). For instance, the executive or legislature might simply refuse to 
implement or follow the court’s decisions or provide insufficient funds for effective 
implementation. Thus, when a court hears a case involving the interests of those 
controlling the executive and the legislature, any decision against their interests may 
disrupt the implementation of the decision (Rosenberg, 1992). In this regard, the 
legislature may overrule the court’s decision by drafting a new legislation, or the 
executive may impede or ignore that ruling.  
While using all these “punishment” tools the executive and legislature must 
weigh a variety of factors, such as public reaction, in deciding whether to employ these 
tools. Similarly, the court’s public legitimacy may erode if it constantly takes decisions 
that are in favor of the incumbent government. But anticipating a possible override of 
its decisions; alteration in the tenure and assignment of its judges; or decrease in its 
budget and resources, the court will still face incentives to sacrifice its most preferred 
choices and choose the next best option that it believes the other political branches will 
support (e.g., Ferejohn and Shipan, 1990; Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992; Spiller and 
Gely, 1992). In this regard, situations in which the judges recognize the constraints 
imposed by other political actors and suppress their own preferences because of these 
constraints provide evidence of strategic voting.  
The anticipation of a possible reaction by elected branches is presented by the 
proponents of separation-of-powers approach as a central determinant of strategic 
voting. According to them, certain characteristics of the incumbent government 
influence the court’s strategic calculations. The strength of government, for instance, 
will affect the judges’ anticipation of political reactions to their decisions. Under 
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divided government, the legislature and executive will encounter certain difficulties to 
coordinate. This will constitute an obstacle to sanction the judiciary but enable the court 
to efficiently constrain and control the executive and legislature. On the other hand, 
unified government will create a threatening environment for judges, increasing the 
probability of their decisions being reversed. For that reason, under a unified 
government, the likelihood of judges deciding against the government will diminish. 
Following the basic insight of the veto player theory (Tsebilis, 2002), 
Iarcyzower, Spiller and Tomassi (2002) argue that the absence of a unified government 
enables judges who were negatively predisposed to the administration to cast their true 
or “sincere” preferences. As they show, during periods of unified government in 
democratic Argentina, the court was much more likely to show deference to the 
government than in periods when power was divided between the executive and 
legislature because under unified government it is easier for political actors to 
coordinate a response to the judiciary’s activism. Scribner (2003) observes the same 
trend in Chile. When the democratic government was divided, the Supreme Court of 
Chile was more willing to decide against government decrees. Rios-Figueroa’s (2006) 
study in other Latin American countries also suggests that under unified government, 
the Supreme Court judges expect their potential rulings against executive abuses not to 
be welcomed by the majority in Congress so that the elected branches will easily 
coordinate and pass legislation breaching the interests of the judiciary. Most of these 
studies assume that the government structure exhibits a uniform impact on the court’s 
decision-making across a wide variety of contexts. Nevertheless, I argue that there 
exists systematic variation in the impact of government structure on the court’s 
decisions that can be explained theoretically and tested empirically.  
 
 
 
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
The theoretical framework of this article posits that certain case-level 
characteristics can attenuate the magnitude of strategic voting. In this regard, I provide 
a theoretical rationale for (a) why there is a systematic variation in the government 
structure–court behavior relationship across cases and (b) the types of case-level factors 
that will shape the government structure–court behavior relationship. Because 
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situational characteristics across cases can trigger different motivations and 
considerations, the importance that the court gives to a possible reaction from the 
political branches are expected to vary across cases.  
As stated in the previous section, many scholars have argued that under unified 
government it is easier for political actors to coordinate a response to the judiciary’s 
activism. This will increase the fear judges have regarding retaliation or retribution for 
unpopular decisions. For that reason, under unified government the court will have 
higher inclination to strategic voting and more likely to uphold laws. In specifying this 
relationship the focus of this chapter is not simply on whether government structure 
guides judicial review, but about when the government structure influences the judicial 
review to lesser extent.  
The cases that come before the constitutional court for review vary along a 
number of dimensions. Certain factors associated with the case under review will 
attenuate the impact of government structure on the court’s decisions. Accordingly, the 
case-level characteristics that are hypothesized to influence strategic voting are the 
following: origins of the law, identity of the litigant, and the constitutional ground on 
which the litigant brings the case.  
The first case-level factor is origins of the law and it refers to the political 
alignment between the court and government that enacted the law under review. I argue 
that the political alignment between the majority of judges in the court and the political 
majority that enacted the law under review is likely to affect the court’s decision. More 
importantly, I suggest that this alignment will influence the degree of strategic voting. 
For instance, a law that was passed under a Parliament dominated by Party A may 
come up for review when Party B is in power. Assuming that the political preferences 
of majority of judges are closer to Party A, the court would have higher tendency to 
uphold the laws supported by Party A. From the court’s point of view these types of 
laws can be identified as ‘friendly’ laws. On the other hand, the probability of striking 
down laws would increase when Party B has enacted the laws under review. And from 
the court’s viewpoint these laws can be identified as ‘unfriendly’ laws.  
These expectations are not new since the attitudinal approach argues that the 
Court will strike down the acts of its partisan opponents and uphold the acts of its 
partisan allies (Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Lindquist and Solberg, 2006; Howard and 
Segal, 2004). Attitudinalists expect the Court to invalidate statutes enacted by 
ideologically distant elected branches, regardless of the elected branches sitting at the 
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time. Nevertheless, in line with the proponents of separation-of-powers approach I 
assume that under every situation the political context has a certain influence on the 
court’s decision-making. For that reason, my goal is to account for to what extent the 
political alignment between the court and the enacting government would influence the 
impact of government structure on the court’s likelihood of invalidating laws. In line 
with the literature, I expect that the constitutional court is more willing to uphold laws 
under the ruling of a unified government. But additionally I hypothesize that under 
unified government the court’s likelihood of invalidating laws will increase when the 
court reviews an unfriendly law. Accordingly, the first hypothesis of this study is: 
 
Hypothesis-1: The magnitude of strategic voting will be lower in cases where 
there is weak political alignment between the enacting government and the 
court.  
 
The second case-level factor is identity of the litigant who brings the case before 
the constitutional court. Judges know that at different times majorities of different 
political inclinations will dominate the political system and so they cannot simply serve 
the incumbent government at the expense of the other political actors’ interests. The 
logic is somewhat similar to the one employed by Helmke (2005) who analyzes the 
behavior of the Argentinean Constitutional Court. One of her interesting findings is that 
when the judges have reasons to believe that the incumbent regime is close to losing 
power, they will shift their decisions to favor the incoming government. In this way, 
they signal their willingness to serve the interests of a new majority. Similarly, Stone-
Sweet (2000) argues that when the president appears as a litigant before the court, 
judges will be more likely to invalidate legislative statutes (Stone-Sweet, 2000). Given 
all these arguments, I expect that regardless of the ideological inclinations of the 
political actors who bring the cases for reviews, the court has greater tendency to 
invalidate the laws that are brought by the political actors compared to the laws that are 
brought by other courts. For that reason, I might expect: 
 
Hypothesis-2: The magnitude of strategic voting will be lower in cases where 
the litigant is a political actor.  
 
45 
 
The third case-level factor is the constitutional ground on which the litigant 
brings a case before the constitutional court. The litigants demand the annulment of a 
law (or portion of it) for its violation of certain principles of the country’s constitution. 
I suggest that the referral reasons would significantly influence the magnitude of 
strategic voting. For instance, it has long been argued that the court acts in counter-
majoritarian fashion to protect the rights of minorities (Bickel, 1962). Supporting this 
traditional view of the court Thomas Keck (2007:321) has also identified the “general 
libertarian orientation toward free speech” as one of the most important institutional 
concerns that animated the Court’s decisions over the last quarter century. In line with 
these arguments that identify the promotion of freedom and justice as the main duty of 
the judiciary, I hypothesize that when the litigant demands the annulment of a law for 
its violation of individual rights, the magnitude of strategic voting will decrease:  
 
Hypothesis-3: The magnitude of strategic voting will be lower in cases where 
the referral reasons for striking down a law include individual rights violations. 
 
Evidence would be inconsistent with these hypotheses if the stated case-level 
factors do not affect the explanatory power of the government structure. Before the 
empirical evaluation of these hypotheses, in the next section I briefly explain the 
organization and decision-making process of the Turkish Constitutional Court and the 
empirical setting of the constitutional review in Turkey.  
 
 
 
3.4 The Turkish Constitutional Court and the Constitutional Review Database 
 
 
 
Before moving from hypothetical arguments to analyzing real world events, it is 
important to focus on the key assumptions underlying the given hypotheses. First and 
foremost, it is necessary to explain the actors’ preferences, beliefs, and expectations. In 
this case, for example, how plausible is it to assume that Turkish judges believed that 
they are constrained by the political context in which they act? And, did they have 
sufficient reason to believe that the direction of their opinions could affect the sanctions 
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they faced? To begin to answer these questions, this part draws on the institutional 
design of the Turkish Constitutional Court.  
Until the transition to multi-party system in 1945, the Republican People’s 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) ruled Turkey without facing any political 
opposition. In the 1950s the CHP found itself in opposition and the Democrat Party 
(Demokrat Parti, DP) government passed a series of laws that severely restricted the 
rights of the opposition. Hence following the 1960 military coup that overthrew the DP 
government, the necessity of legal control over the legislative and executive organs 
appeared as an urgent issue. As Özbudun (2000:53) argues the absence of checks and 
balances in the 1924 constitution was ‘the main reason for the collapse of the first 
Turkish experiment with democracy’. One of the central goals of the 1961 constitution, 
which was drafted jointly by the military and civilians, was to provide the separation of 
powers system and transform Turkey from a majoritarian to a pluralistic democracy 
(Özbudun, 1993). As a result, the Turkish Constitutional Court was established by the 
1961 Constitution and began to carry out its activities in April 1962. With the 1982 
constitution and the 2010 constitutional amendments the Turkish Constitutional Court 
underwent certain changes. Yet, since this study focuses on the 1984-2010 period, in 
this part of the chapter I will mainly focus on the institutional design of the court as it is 
framed in the 1982 constitution.   
In the establishment of the Turkish Constitutional Court, the European 
(Kelsenian) model was adopted as the basic model for constitutional review
22
. The 
functions and organizational structure of the German, Italian and the Austrian 
Constitutional Courts were taken into account in giving the final shape to the court 
(official website of the Turkish Constitutional Court). Like its European counterparts 
the Turkish Constitutional Court decides only on constitutional issues and conducts 
                                                          
22
 The European model differs from the American one in several respects. First, unlike 
the American model where courts at all levels have the power to review the 
constitutionality of legislative and executive acts, the European model introduces a 
specialized constitutional court that alone holds the power of judicial review. Second, 
the European constitutional courts typically study not only concrete controversies 
involving actual alleged violations of citizens‘ constitutional rights, as in the U.S., but 
also abstract challenges to the constitutionality of legislations. And usually these 
challenges are exerted both after the legislative act has been enacted and implemented. 
Third, unlike in the American model the higher court judges are given limited tenure 
and reappointment is rarely permitted. Furthermore, the European court judges are not 
popular public figures as it is the case in the American context (Ferejohn, 2002; 
Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova, 2001).  
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both abstract and concrete review of norms. Regarding the abstract review of norms, 
the constitutionality of laws, decrees and the rules of procedure of the Turkish 
Parliament are challenged directly before the Court through an annulment action. This 
procedure enables the court to examine the constitutionality of a law without reference 
to any specific case. Abstract review procedures in Turkey are a posteriori. This means 
that the legislation in question must first be implemented before its constitutionality can 
be challenged. The right to apply for annulment directly to the Constitutional Court 
lapses sixty days after publication in the Official Gazette of the contested law, decree or 
the rules of procedure of the Parliament (The Constitution of Republic of Turkey, 
Article 151). These cases can be brought before the Court for abstract review by the 
President of the Republic
23
, the parliamentary group of the main party in government, 
the main opposition party, or a minimum of one-fifth of the total number of members 
of the parliament (The Constitution of Republic of Turkey, Article 150).  
In addition to the abstract control of norms, the Turkish constitutional court also 
has the authority for concrete review of norms. The allegation of unconstitutionality 
can be initiated any time by the general, administrative and military courts. If a court 
finds that the law or the decree having the force of law or a provision thereof to be 
applied in a pending case is unconstitutional, or if it is convinced of the seriousness of a 
claim of unconstitutionality that may be submitted by one of the parties, it applies to 
the Constitutional Court to decide on constitutionality and it postpones the proceeding 
of the case until the Court decides on the issue (The Constitution of Republic of 
Turkey, Article 152). In the constitution it is indicated that no allegation of 
unconstitutionality shall be made with regard to the same legal provision until ten years 
elapse after publication in the Official Gazette of the decision of the Court dismissing 
the application on its merits (The Constitution of Republic of Turkey, Article 152). 
Other than the power of judicial review, the Court has some further political 
powers such as supervising political parties and trying high-ranking officials such as 
the President, the members of the Council of Ministers, the members of the Parliament 
and the members of the Constitutional Court itself and the other high courts and public 
prosecutors (The Constitution of Republic of Turkey, Articles 90 and 148). The Court 
                                                          
23
 The President of Turkish Republic has the authority to return any law to the 
Parliament for review before its promulgation. But this is not a very strong veto power 
because if the parliament enacts the same law without amendment, then the president 
must promulgate it. 
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does not serve as appellate court for ordinary disputes and litigations. Furthermore, 
until the 2010 constitutional amendments, there was no mechanism in Turkey for 
individual constitutional complaints so that the Court has not reviewed the concrete 
controversies involving actual alleged violations of citizens’ constitutional rights. 
Judges of the Turkish constitutional court do not serve for lifetime but for a 
specific time period. The Court’s judges have to be at least 40 years old at the time of 
their appointment and hold office until they reach retirement at the age of 65. For that 
reason, the average tenure of a judge on the court is relatively short. The statistical 
figures show that since 1962 a judge in the Turkish Constitutional Court serves for an 
average of 6 years 8 months
24
 (Anayasa Mahkemesi Üyeliği, official website). Apart 
from reasons of age, the office of constitutional court judges may be terminated upon 
conviction of an offense requiring dismissal from the judicial profession, for reasons of 
health or when it is understood that they are not “eligible” for office. The Constitutional 
Court itself decides with the absolute majority of the total number of its members on 
the termination of membership (The Constitution of Republic of Turkey, Article 147). 
And since 1962 there has been no evidence of removal of judges and no instance of 
court-packing. However the vagueness of the non-eligibility condition still appears to 
threaten the independence of judges.   
An important organizational difference between the Turkish Constitutional 
Court and some of its European counterparts is related to the appointment process of 
the judges. In most democracies parliamentarians appoint the members of the 
constitutional courts. In the European model, for instance, the parliament and popularly 
elected presidents appoint judges of the constitutional courts. In the Turkish case, 
however, the 1982 constitution attributes no role to the Parliament in appointing the 
constitutional court judges. The President of the Turkish Republic, an official elected 
by the parliament, is the only person who appoints all the judges. Hence the 
Constitutional Court is composed of eleven regular and four substitute members
25
 
whom are appointed by the president from among candidates nominated by other high 
courts and the Higher Education Council (The Constitution of Republic of Turkey, 
Article 146). Although the President is required by the constitution to remain politically 
independent, one can easily infer that having the authority for judicial appointment, the 
                                                          
24
 With the 2010 constitutional amendments the tenure of judges is fixed to 12 years. 
25
 With the 2010 constitutional amendments the number of judges is increased to 17. 
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President will appoint likeminded judges or at least try to prevent the appointment of 
judges whose preferences s/he doesn’t like. 
Taking into consideration the institutional design of the Turkish Constitutional 
Court one might argue that the constitutional structures leave the Court immune from 
political constraint. Yet, this argument can be easily challenged. First, compared to the 
U.S constitution, for instance, the Turkish constitution is more flexible and it is 
relatively easier to amend it. A political party that holds majority in the parliament can 
easily change the constitutional articles which protect the judiciary from political 
intervention. In 2010, for instance, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) that have held majority of the seats in the Parliament adopted 
certain constitutional amendments. In line with these amendments, in addition to the 
President the parliament is also given authority to appoint some of the judges
26
. 
Second, the parliament has always held the authority to control the budget and financial 
resources of the judiciary and this has been another factor that has prevented the judges 
from perceiving themselves as completely independent. Finally, although the 
institutional guarantees outlined in constitutions are important determinants for the 
independence of a judiciary, high levels of constitutional protections do not 
automatically lead to high levels of judicial independence in practice.  
 
 
 
3.4.1 Decisions Data 
 
 
The goal of this chapter is to account for how case-related factors influence 
strategic voting of the constitutional court. With this goal in mind, I seek to explain the 
Turkish Constitutional Court’s choices to strike down laws. I use an original data set on 
all constitutional decisions where the Court reviews the constitutionality of laws, 
decrees and procedures of the Parliament. The data set includes decisions that were 
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 With the 2010 amendments three of the constitutional court members are appointed 
by the Parliament among the three candidates nominated by the Court of Accounts and 
presidents of the Bar Associations for each vacant seat. In the first ballot two thirds 
majority of the total number of members of the Parliament is required in order to elect a 
judge and absolute majority is needed in the second ballot. Other fourteen members of 
the Court are appointed by the President of the Republic.  
50 
 
resolved by the constitutional court between January 1, 1984
27
 and December 31, 2010. 
The constitutional court decided on 1028 analytically distinct constitutional cases 
during this period and 54% of the challenged norms were found unconstitutional. As 
previously stated, the judicial politics literature suggests that under unified government 
the Court is more likely to uphold laws. Yet, showing trends in the percentages of cases 
where a law (or portion of it) is annulled by the Court, Figure 3.1 clearly illustrates the 
existence of other factors that would attenuate or escalate the impact of government 
structure on the court’s decisions. The percentages of laws that were strike down by the 
Court show considerable variation even within the same governmental period. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of decisions and percentage of annulments, 1984-2010 
 
 
Source: Data were compiled by the author from the decisions of the Turkish Constitutional 
Court, published on the official website of the court (http://www.anayasa.gov.tr). 
Note: The y-axis on the right shows the total number of valid constitutional review decisions 
excluding party closures, other types of cases and procedural rejections. The y-axis on the left 
shows the percentage of annulments. It is calculated as annulments over total number of valid 
decisions excluding party closures, other types of cases and procedural rejections.  
                                                          
27
 Turkey’s last military rule runs between 1980 and 1983.  The first national election 
after the military  coup was held on November 6
th
, 1983 and the Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) came to power on December 1983. For that reason I start 
the analysis of the Court’s decisions by 1 January 1984. 
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The 1962–1982 period of constitutional review was not included in the dataset 
because the institutional design of the Turkish Constitutional Court differs between 
these two periods. For instance, the 1961 constitution shared the appointment powers 
between the Parliament and the President, whereas the 1982 constitution gave this 
power only to the President. Additionally, while the 1961 constitution had granted the 
referral power to larger number of political actors
28
, the 1982 constitution restricted 
these referrals. Since these kinds of institutional differences would affect the Court’s 
perception of political constraints, I focused on the 1984-2010 period which does not 
show variation in the institutional design of the court.  
For the 1984–2010 terms, the data was obtained from the Court’s decisions 
published in the official website of the Turkish Constitutional Court
29
. Referral and 
review numbers, referral and review dates, type of constitutional review (iptal or 
itiraz), referring authorities, name of law, publication date of law, type of law (law, 
decree or procedure for the parliament), articles of the constitution cited as referral 
reason, and the Court’s decisions constitute the dataset. Cases related to the dissolution 
and financial audit of political parties, trial of statesmen before the Grand Tribunal 
(Yüce Divan) and procedural rejections were excluded from the dataset.  
Finally, I should point out that taking as data the final decisions of the court is 
not a problem in the Turkish case because the court cannot select its cases as in the US 
case. In the US case, the Supreme Court enjoys discretionary docket so that the cases 
are chosen by the judges themselves. For that reason, the problem with analyzing only 
the outcomes in these decisions is that the criteria by which those cases were selected 
for inclusion on the Court’s docket may have included a consideration of the political 
actors’ policy preferences. The Court may refrain from granting certiorari because it 
can anticipate its own deferential response (Cross and Nelson, 2001: 1476; Epstein and 
Knight, 1998: 84). Nevertheless, the Turkish constitutional court does not have a 
                                                          
28
 According to Article 149 of the 1961 constitution the following actors are granted 
referral authority: the President, parliamentary groups in either house, political parties 
that had parliamentary groups in the lower house, political parties that had obtained 10 
percent of the valid votes in the most recent general election, one-sixth of the members 
of either house, and, when it concerned their existence or duties, the Supreme Council 
of Judges and Public Prosecutors, the Supreme Court, the Council of State, the 
Supreme Military Court and universities. 
29
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=search&id
=24 
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discretionary docket privilege. This aspect insures that the court decisions which are 
analyzed in this study do not suffer a selection bias from the preferences of the Court. 
The judges, in concrete or abstract review cases, cannot choose the cases they want to 
rule on based on their a priori preferences and cannot avoid ruling on contentious 
issues. 
 
 
 
3.5 Measurement and Empirical Model 
 
 
 
The central goal of this study is to explain whether and to what extent certain 
case-level characteristics influence the magnitude of strategic voting. As I noted earlier, 
strategic voting refers to the impact of government structure on the court’s likelihood of 
striking down laws. Looking at the Court as a whole, the dependent variable of this 
study, strike, is a binary variable that measures whether the constitutional court 
invalidated a law/decree (or portion of it) through constitutional review actions. Strike 
is coded 1 if the court declares a law/decree (or portion of it) unconstitutional and 
invalidates it on constitutional grounds. It is coded 0 if the court finds the law/decree 
constitutional in its entirety and upholds it. While the dependent variable of this study 
is a court’s decision for or against the constitutionality of the challenged norm, the 
independent variables are indicators of the government structure, identity of the litigant, 
origin of the law and referral reason. To analyze to what extent case-level factors affect 
the explanatory power of the government structure I use the following structural model: 
 
ln (S/1-S) = α+   (  )    (  )    (  )    (  )    (     )    (     )  
                         (     )  (    )    
 
S refers to the probability of the Court’s binary decision on each case to strike down a 
law (or portion of it). In this model ug refers to unified government which measures the 
government structure; ul to unfriendly law which is a measure of political alignment 
between the court and the enacting government; pl to political litigant which measures 
identity of the litigant; ir to individual right which measures the inclusion of individual 
rights violations as a referral reason. While    refers to vectors of control variables; α is 
the intercept;    are k coefficients to be estimated; and   is the error term. Given the 
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structure of the dependent variable, this model will be estimated via binary logistic 
regression.  
 
 
 
Unified Government: In agreement with the existing studies, the theoretical 
framework of this chapter suggests that the court’s decisions reflect the incumbent 
government’s preferences when the sitting political actors have the political strength to 
constrain the court. Given the institutional structure of the Turkish political system, this 
will depend on the incumbent’s degree of control over the Parliament. An incumbent 
government that holds majority of the seats in the parliament can make constitutional 
reforms, decrease the financial resources of the judiciary or pass a law similar to the 
one annulled by the constitutional court. To capture the governmental control over the 
parliament I create a binary variable, unified government, which refers to whether the 
incumbent government at the time the constitutional decision was taken, is a unified or 
divided government.
30
 
Unified government refers to the situation where a single political party 
controls the executive, has a majority in the parliament and the capacity to enact laws. 
In this regard, unified government is coded 1 when the sitting government is a single 
majority party at the time the Court takes the decision. On the other hand, divided 
government refers to the situation where a single political party does not have the 
capacity to enact laws by itself. Hence, unified government is coded 0 when the 
incumbent government is a coalition government at the time the Court takes the 
decision. In our data 62% of the decisions were taken under unified governments, but 
the Court found only 45% of these claims unconstitutional. On the other hand, although 
38% of the decisions were taken under the rule of coalition governments, the Court 
found 57% of these claims unconstitutional.    
 
Unfriendly Law: The theoretical framework of this study posits that the political 
alignment between the constitutional court and the enacting government affects the 
court’s strategic voting. To capture the political alignment between the court and the 
enacting government I create a binary variable, unfriendly law, and code it 1 if the law 
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 See Appendix A for detailed information about the unified and divided governments 
in Turkey.  
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under review is passed by a government whose political preferences are quite different 
from the majority of the judges’ political preferences and 0 otherwise.  
To measure the political alignment between the court and the enacting 
government, we need a proxy for the partisan affiliation of the individual judges. In the 
US context, for instance, judges are appointed by the president who is politically 
affiliated either to the Republican or Democratic Party. For that reason, one can easily 
show the political party with which the majority of the judges are affiliated. In the 
Turkish context, however, this task is quite challenging for two reasons. First, the 
President of the Turkish Republic is elected by the members of the Parliament. The 
candidates for presidency can be chosen from among the parliament members or 
proposed from outside the parliament by at least one-fifth of the total number of 
members of the parliament (The Constitution of Republic of Turkey, Article 101). 
More importantly, the constitution clearly states that the president should be politically 
independent from any political party. This creates an obstacle to measuring the political 
alignment between the constitutional court and the enacting government.  
To deal with this problem I use the classification presented by Hazama (2011) 
who categorizes the Turkish Presidents into two main groups: state-elite presidents and 
non-state-elite presidents. He argues that the past affiliation or membership to a non-
elected state institution distinguishes the state-elite presidents from the non-state-elite 
presidents. In line with this definition, Kenan Evren (1982–1989, former chief of the 
general staff and leader of the military junta that seized power in 1980) and Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer (2000–2007, former president of the Constitutional Court) are defined as 
state-elite presidents since they did not have any affiliation to a political party before 
being elected as presidents. On the other hand, the other three presidents who served 
between 1984 and 2010 are defined as non-state-elite presidents: Turgut Özal (1989–
1993), Süleyman Demirel (1993–2000), and Abdullah Gül (2007-present). These 
presidents were former prime ministers who were affiliated to ANAP, DYP and AKP 
respectively.   
The second challenging factor to measure the political alignment between the 
court and the enacting government in the Turkish context is the conceived invariability 
of judges’ preferences. In the Turkish politics literature it has always been argued that 
judicial bureaucrats are state-elites and the Turkish Constitutional Court defends the 
values and interests of the state-elites (Belge, 2006; Shambayati and Kirdiş, 2009). Yet, 
55 
 
one should not forget that the President will appoint likeminded judges or at least try to 
prevent the appointment of judges whose preferences s/he doesn’t like31.  
Taking all these aspects into consideration the law under review is considered 
unfriendly and coded 1 whenever a) it was passed under the ruling of a state-elite 
political party
32
 and majority of the judges in the Court was appointed by a non-state-
elite president; and b) it was passed under the ruling of a non-state-elite political party 
and majority of the judges in the Court was appointed by a state-elite president, and 0 
otherwise. The data shows that unfriendly laws constituted 43.7 percent of the cases 
that were decided by the Court between the 1984-2010 periods. And 53.3 percent of 
these unfriendly laws were found unconstitutional.  
 
Political Litigant: This study argues that identity of the litigant does not only affect the 
court’s probability of invalidating laws but also affect the magnitude of strategic 
voting. I suggest that the Court will be more likely to invalidate legislative statutes 
when asked directly by the political actors through litigation. To measure the identity of 
the litigant I have created a dummy variable, political litigant, which is coded 1 when 
the litigant is a political actor (the President; the main opposition party; or a minimum 
of one-fifth of the total number of members of the parliament), and coded 0 when the 
litigant is another type of court (the general, administrative and military courts). The 
data shows that 32.5 percent of the cases decided by the Court are brought by political 
parties. But more interestingly, in 71.8 percent of these cases the court found 
unconstitutional grounds.  
 
Violation of Individual Rights: When they bring a case before the court for judicial 
review, the litigants demand the annulment of a law (or portion of it) arguing that it 
                                                          
31
 Since the tenure of a judge in the Turkish Constitutional Court is approximately 6.5 
years on average, the makeup of the Courts tends to track the presidency returns very 
closely. 
32
 Hazama (2011) uses the state-elite and non-state elite categorization for the Turkish 
political parties as well. The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 
CHP), for instance, played a central role in the establishment of the Turkish Republic 
and is considered a state-elite party (Özbudun, 1993). As the descendants of this party, 
the Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokratik Halkçı Parti, SHP) and the 
Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) are also considered as state-elite 
parties. All other political parties in the parliament are considered as non-state-elite 
parties.  
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violates certain principles of the constitution. In this regard, the theoretical framework 
of this study suggests that when the litigant brings the violation of individual rights as 
referral reason, the magnitude of strategic voting will decrease in these types of cases. 
In these types of cases the impact of government structure on the court’s decisions is 
hypothesized to attenuate.  
In this study I measure the issue of violation of individual rights by looking at 
the constitutional articles that a litigant indicates as a referral reason. I create a dummy 
variable, individual rights, code it 1 when the litigant mentions the violation of the 
constitutional articles that deal with the individual rights and 0 otherwise. The articles 
in the 1982 Turkish constitution which deal with individual rights include all articles in 
Part Two: Fundamental Rights and Duties (Articles 12 to 74). These articles pertain to 
the fundamental rights and duties of the individual, the social and economic rights and 
duties, and the political rights and duties. In 57 percent of the cases decided by the 
court, the litigants include the violation of individual rights among their referral 
reasons. And 45 percent of these challenges are found unconstitutional.  
 
Control variables: In the empirical model of this study I control for three potential 
influences on judicial decision-making. First, I control for the type of legislative acts 
that are being reviewed. Laws passed by the legislature are the most common type of 
acts reviewed by the Turkish Constitutional Court. Additionally, the court may review 
government decrees which the government is authorized to issue, and rules of 
procedures of the Parliament. To capture the type of legislative act that is reviewed by 
the court I create a dummy variable, type of law, coded 1 when the court reviews a law 
passed by the legislature and 0 when it reviews a governmental decree or a 
Parliamentary decision. Our data shows that 88.5 percent of the legislative acts that are 
reviewed by the Turkish Constitutional Court are laws passed by the parliament. The 
data also shows that while governmental decrees or parliamentary decisions constitute 
only 11.5 of the cases, almost 91 percent of these governmental decrees and procedures 
of the parliament are found unconstitutional. 
In order to address the possibility that the court usually tries to uphold the laws 
passed by the incumbent government, I also include a dummy variable, 
enacting/incumbent same party, taking on the value 1 if the enacting and incumbent 
governments were under the control of the same political party (ies), and 0 otherwise. 
Defying the traditional view of the Court as a counter-majoritarian institution, in his 
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seminal study Dahl (1957) found that in American Politics the Supreme Court rarely 
invalidated policies favored by the party coalition then in control of the presidency and 
Congress. He argued that the Court is supportive of the policies of political institutions 
at the time the judicial decision is taken but annuls older laws that had been passed by 
the political actors who are no longer in power (Dahl, 1957). Following the Dahlian 
paradigm, many scholars asserted that judges generally share the policy preferences of 
the dominant governing coalition (Clayton and Pickerill, 2006; Peretti, 1999) and 
“almost never engage in policy-making that challenges those power-holders who are in 
a position to assault their nominal independence” (Gillman 2003, 251). It has also been 
argued that “rather than a check on majority power, the courts often function as arenas 
for extending, legitimizing, harmonizing, or protecting the policy agenda of political 
elites or groups within the dominant governing coalition” (Clayton and Pickerill, 2006: 
1391). If the Court tends to avoid challenging the policies of the contemporary 
government, as suggested by these scholars, this variable should be negatively 
associated with judicial review. In about 55% of the cases decided by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court the enacting and incumbent governments are identical.  
An additional control variable that is of interest here is whether the behavior of 
the court changes across time. In other words, I suggest that the number of years an 
incumbent government stays in office may influence the court’s decision-making. In 
the first years of the incumbent government’s ruling, for instance, the court may be 
more inclined to uphold laws since the government has just came to power and will 
stay in power for a long time. On the other hand, as the years go by the court may be 
more prone to strike down laws because with the approaching elections the probability 
of power change will increase. To account for this possibility, I have included a 
continuous variable, months in power, which measures number of months an incumbent 
government is in power. The data shows that in Turkey between 1984-2010 periods the 
average time that an incumbent government stays in power is 53 months. 
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3.6 An Analysis of Decision Making on the Turkish Constitutional Court 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 displays results from two binary logistic estimations. In these models 
the dependent variable is strike and it measures whether the court invalidates a law or 
not. In the first model, I include only the key variables of interest (unified government; 
unfriendly law; political litigant; violation of individual rights) and three control 
variables (type of law; enacting/incumbent same party; months in power). In the second 
model, on the other hand, to test the hypotheses of this study, interactions between the 
case-level factors (unfriendly law, political litigant, and violation of individual rights) 
and government structure (unified government) are included. These interactions test 
whether and to what extent the impact of government structure on the court’s 
invalidation of laws changes across certain case-level characteristics. In other words, 
these interactions show whether the indicated case-level variables show significant 
effects on the magnitude of strategic voting that is represented by the coefficient of 
unified government. The coefficients for these case-level factors that are presented in 
Model-2 represent their conditional effects on the probability of striking down a law 
when unified government variable is equal to zero. And the effect of unified 
government is conditional on all variables with which it is interacted.  
In Model 1 the coefficient of unified government shows that in line with the 
existing theories and our expectation its impact on the court’s strategic voting is 
negative and statistically significant. This means that under a unified government when 
the constitutional court reviews a case where the court reviews a friendly law, the 
litigant is not a political actor and the referral reason does not include any statement of 
violations of individual rights the court is more likely to uphold laws. Yet as shown in 
Table 3.1, the significance of the interaction terms confirms that the impact of unified 
government (government structure) significantly changes across certain case-level 
factors. 
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Table 3.1: Effects of case-level factors on strategic voting, 1984-2010: 
 Estimates of binary logistic model 
 
  
 
Model 1         Model 2 
   Unified government -0.42* -1.35*** 
 
(0.19) (0.29) 
Unfriendly law 0.32* 0.69* 
 
(0.15) (0.29) 
Political litigant 1.35*** 1.27*** 
 
(0.18) (0.20) 
Individual rights -0.61* -0.75** 
 
(0.17) (0.24) 
Unified government*Unfriendly law 
 
1.06** 
  
(0.35) 
Unified government*Political litigant 
 
0.71* 
  
(0.31) 
Unified government*Individual rights 
 
0.82** 
  
(0.30) 
Type of law -2.02*** -2.01*** 
 
(0.34) (0.34) 
Months in power 0.004 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Enacting/incumbent same party -0.32 -0.50** 
 
(0.18) (0.18) 
Constant 2.02*** 2.31*** 
 
(0.36) (0.36) 
   N 1028 1028 
Prob>chi2 0 0 
Pseudo R square 0.14 0.15 
 
Note: The unit of analysis is the constitutional court's decision, coded 1 when the court 
invalidates a law (or portion of it) or 0 when the court upholds the law. Cell entries are logistic 
regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***<0.001, **<0.01, * <0.05 
 
 
I discuss the results in Table 3.1 in conjunction with Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2, 
which present a clear substantive view of the results, showing the probability of 
striking down laws for each case-level factor. In Figure 3.2, I present the baseline 
probability for striking down laws under the rule of a unified government. This allows 
one to see how the predicted probability of striking down laws is compared to the 
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baseline probability. The baseline probability is calculated by holding months in power 
to its mean, unified government and other control variables constant to 1, and all case-
level variables to 0.
33
 Thus, it represents the prediction that the court will strike down a 
law under unified government which is 53 months in office and when the litigant is not 
a political actor, the law under review is friendly law, the litigant does not bring the 
violation of individual rights as a referral reason, and when the enacting and incumbent 
governments are same. Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 show that under these conditions the 
probability of observing that the court will strike down such a law is not very high: 
22%.  
The results from the interactions presented in Table 3.1 indicate that all of the 
hypothesized variables exhibit statistically significant effects on strategic voting. In 
support of the first hypothesis, the empirical results show that the review of an 
unfriendly law significantly decreases the impact of strategic voting. The coefficient on 
the unified government*unfriendly law interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant suggesting that the effect of unified government on the annulment of laws 
decreases for cases where the court reviews unfriendly laws. In other words, when the 
court reviews unfriendly laws under unified government the probability of invalidating 
laws tremendously increases. When unfriendly law is “1”, the coefficient for unified 
government is (-1.35+1.06*1) = -0.29 suggesting that the importance of unified 
government as a predictor decreases for cases where the court reviews unfriendly laws. 
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 also show that when the court reviews an unfriendly law 
instead of friendly law the probability of striking down laws increases from 22% 
(baseline probability) up to 37%. The high levels of annulment suggest that when the 
court reviews unfriendly laws, it tends not to take into consideration the political 
constraints that are at their highest levels under unified governments. In this regard the 
strategic calculations of judges appear to diminish when they review unfriendly laws. 
 
 
                                                          
33
 In Appendix B you can find the table and figure of predicted probabilities that are 
calculated by taking the mean of all variables. For instance, to compute the predicted 
probabilities of strategic voting for cases where the court reviews unfriendly laws, I set 
unfriendly law to 0 and all variables to their mean values. The dotted line in the Figure 
is the “average” probability of striking down laws under the rule unified government. 
The value is 63 % and it represents the effect of unified government when all other 
variables are held at their mean values. This allows one to see how the predicted 
probability of striking down laws is compared to the baseline probability.  
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Table 3.2: Predicted probabilities: Decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court 
 
 
                     Prob. Strike 
  Under unified government 
Baseline 0.22 
Unfriendly law 0.37 
Political litigant 0.67 
Violation of individual rights 0.23 
 
 
 
Whether the litigant is a political actor or not exhibits statistical significance on 
strategic voting as well. As expected the impact of political litigant on strategic voting 
is in negative direction. Model 2 in Table 3.1 shows that the coefficient for unified 
government*political litigant interaction term is positive and statistically significant. 
This suggests that the effect of unified government on the annulment of laws decreases 
for cases where the litigant is a political actor. In other words under unified government  
when the court reviews cases which are brought before the court by political actors, the 
court’s inclination of invalidating laws tremendously increases. To put it in more 
specific terms, when the litigant is political actor “1”, the coefficient for unified 
government is (-1.35+0.71*1)= -0.64 suggesting that the importance of unified 
government as a predictor decreases for cases when the litigant is a political actor. 
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 also show that when the litigant is a political actor the 
probability of striking down laws almost triples: 67%.  This remarkable increase in the 
probability of striking down laws under the ruling of a unified government suggests 
that while the litigant is a political actor, the Court does not pay too much attention to 
the possible retaliatory actions of the powerful incumbent government. From this 
empirical result one can easily argue that identity of the litigant significantly influences 
the magnitude of strategic voting and this influence is in negative direction. 
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Figure 3.2: Predicted probability of strategic voting as a function of case-level factors 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, Table 3.1 shows that whether a case has violations of individual 
rights among its referral reasons has significant impact on strategic voting. And its 
impact is in the expected direction. When the referral reason includes violation of 
individual rights, the coefficient for unified government is (-1.35+0.82*1) = -0.53 
suggesting that the importance of unified government as a predictor decreases for cases 
when the violation of individual rights is included among the referral reasons. Yet 
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 show that under the ruling of a unified government when the 
court reviews a case where violations of individual rights are presented as referral 
reasons the probability of striking down laws increases only by 1 percent. For that 
reason, we can say that the influence of this factor on the magnitude of strategic voting 
is trivial. 
Regarding the impact of control variables, both models presented in Table 3.1 
show that the Turkish Constitutional Court is more likely to strike down governmental 
decrees rather than the laws passed by the legislature. Similarly, Model 2 indicates that 
the probability of invalidating laws decreases when the Court decides cases where the 
enacting and contemporary governments are controlled by the same political party. This 
finding suggests that the Turkish Constitutional Court does not tend to actively 
challenge policies favored by the incumbent government. Finally, the number of 
0
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months an incumbent government stays in office does not show a significant influence 
on the strategic voting of the Court. 
 
 
 
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
 
The probability of observing a constitutional court deciding to strike down a 
law (or portion of it) is related to whether the court can challenge the elected branches 
and whether it wants to challenge the elected branches. A court can challenge the 
incumbent government and the legislature when it does not face strong political 
constraints. To a larger extent this depends on the political strength of the executive at 
the time decision was taken. The literature suggests that under the ruling of a unified 
government the executive is more powerful since a single political party has the 
capacity to enact laws by itself and constrain the courts in this regard. For that reason, 
many studies argue that under a unified government, the likelihood of judges deciding 
against the government will diminish. In this regard, the court’s inclination to uphold 
laws under the ruling of unified government refers to high levels of strategic voting.   
While the existing literature has assumed that the political context exhibits 
uniform effects across cases, I have highlighted the importance of case-level context 
and argued that the impact of government structure on the court’s decisions changes 
across cases in a systematic way. Case-level stimuli activate cost-benefit calculations to 
varying degrees, leading to variation in the magnitude of strategic voting. From the 
analysis of the Turkish Constitutional Court decisions taken between 1984-2010 
periods, the empirical evidence supported all hypotheses. Unfriendly laws, for instance, 
appear to elicit a lower magnitude of strategic voting than friendly laws. Similarly 
when the litigant is a political actor the magnitude of strategic voting appears to 
decrease compared to when the litigant is another court. Finally, although the influence 
of violation of individual rights on the relationship between government structure and 
annulment of laws is significant, its impact appears to be minor.  
In general, this study has sought to increase the knowledge of constitutional 
court decisions in parliamentary systems by systematically examining the conditions 
that weaken the impact of government structure on the choices that the judges make. 
Despite the prominence of the existing models on judicial decision-making, my 
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research demonstrates that they are still open to certain refinements. And future 
research can continue this trend. Hopefully scholars will continue to probe these types 
of extensions to understand further conditions under which political factors or judges’ 
preferences influence the court’s final decisions to lesser or greater extents. Such 
inquiries can further contribute to the theoretical perspectives central to the study of 
judicial decision-making. More importantly, such work can expand our knowledge and 
understanding of how judges make decisions on the important questions that face them. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS THROUGH STRATEGIC LITIGATION: 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
The formation of higher courts with extensive jurisdiction led to the expansion 
of judicial power in many countries
34
 and triggered the interference of the judiciary into 
the activities of the legislature and executive. As a result of this trend, it is argued that 
judges "have developed into powerful institutional actors or policymakers" (Shapiro 
and Stone-Sweet, 1994: 401), who "direct the making of public policies" (Tate, 1995: 
28) and "intervene in the legislative process" (Stone-Sweet, 1992: 235). As Shapiro 
(1981: 155) notes, these courts “are not expected to be ‘neutral’ but instead to be active 
instruments for the promotion of the newly established democratic regimes and 
guardians against any backsliding into earlier antidemocratic political ways.” This 
process of “global expansion of judicial power” is often referred to as the 
“judicialization of politics” (Tate and Vallinder, 1995) and defined as a “transfer of 
decision-making rights” from the legislative and executive bodies to the courts 
(Vallinder, 1995:13).  
Even though the courts play a crucial role in shaping the governmental policies, 
we do not really know much about what triggers the judicialization of politics in the 
first place. The cases do not come to the courts at random but rather litigants bring 
them to the courts. Thus it is crucial to understand why, when and under which 
                                                          
34
 The expansion of judicial power has been causally related to the demand to prevent 
the human rights violations of the Second World War period (Shapiro, 2002) and to 
consolidate the global diffusion of democracy (Tate and Vallinder, 1995).  
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conditions the political issues are judicialized instead of addressed and resolved 
through traditional political forums. Do political opposition parties care only about a 
proper judicial review, or are they willing to refer a bill to the court to increase their 
public vote share or secure more seats in parliament? Or perhaps they act mainly to 
further public awareness, foster public discussion, and create pressure for social and 
legislative change? Or, perhaps by referring bills for abstract review the political elites 
in the opposition simply want to place obstacles in the way of an incumbent 
government’s ability to function. Given that an opposition party might be motivated by 
a number of different goals, it is worth exploring under which conditions the political 
opposition parties most frequently turn to the constitutional court. 
The existing studies usually focus on the American cases and they mostly study 
the incentives of interest groups or individuals who act as litigants (e.g. Epp, 1998; 
McCann, 1994). In the American model of judicial review, litigation starts in lower 
courts and can make its way to the higher court only after a complicated process of 
appeals. For that reason the process is very long and less appealing as an effective 
means of political action (Stone-Sweet, 2000). In the European model of judicial 
review, however, because of the abstract review power of the constitutional courts, the 
political opposition parties are essentially the only external actors who can initiate a 
constitutional litigation (Stone-Sweet, 2000). This condition suggests that litigation 
might be used as a useful weapon by the parliamentary oppositions in order to veto the 
policies with which they disagree. But in developing democracies where judicial 
independence is not fully consolidated the opposition parties’ frequent referral to the 
higher court reveals an important puzzle: Why do the opposition political parties 
frequently bring cases in front of the constitutional court and choose to judicialize 
politics although the judiciary is not fully independent? In this regard, exploring the 
conditions under which the political actors in the opposition have higher incentives to 
turn to the judiciary instead of using political channels appears as an imperative area of 
academic investigation.   
In this chapter I suggest that political opposition parties are rational actors who 
tend to use litigation as a tool to differentiate their policy preferences from the policies 
enacted by the incumbent government. Accordingly, I argue that the approaching 
general election affects the willingness of an opposition party to go to the constitutional 
court although the judiciary is not fully independent. This effect is hypothesized to be 
conditioned on the opposition party’s prediction of the upcoming general election 
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results. Specifically, once the opposition party believes that it will lose the upcoming 
election, it will begin facing incentives to increase its referrals to the constitutional 
court to highlight the policy differences on constitutional dimension that in turn may 
increase public awareness and its vote share. Yet once the opposition party foresees 
itself winning the upcoming election, it will not tend to frequently use litigation since 
the costs of pursuing litigation will overweigh the marginal benefits. As a result, this 
study predicts a legal-political cycle in which the number of cases referred to the 
constitutional court by weak political opposition parties increases with the approaching 
election date. I refer to this phenomenon as “strategic litigation theory”.  
Turkey presents a proper case for testing the theory of strategic litigation in a 
context where the judiciary is not fully independent. Similar to the continental 
European model, the Turkish judicial system enables the political opposition parties to 
challenge the constitutionality of the legislation and public policies before the 
constitutional court. Although the phenomenon of legislators’ petitions may be more 
common in Turkey than in many other countries, the Turkish case is by no means 
unique or exceptional. Over the last two decades Turkish elected representatives have 
resorted to litigation as a routine means of their political activity. Nevertheless, within 
legislative periods there is some interesting variation in the litigation practices of the 
opposition parties that needs to be explained. To test the strategic litigation theory, I 
constructed an original data set including all the acts promulgated by the parliament 
between the years 1984-2011, and analyzed all the cases that are brought to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court by the main opposition parties
35
 in the same time period. Building 
on an original data set, this study not only speaks to broader debates surrounding the 
judicialization of politics but also seeks to integrate the Turkish Constitutional Court – 
which is understudied at this point - into the large body of existing research in 
comparative political institutions and judicial politics. Moreover, analyzing the 
conditions that lead to the expansion of judicialization of politics in the Turkish case is 
of crucial importance for understanding similar developments in developing 
parliamentary democracies where the constitutional courts exercise abstract review.   
The article proceeds as follows: the first part of the study gives the theoretical 
framework about the use of strategic litigation by the political opposition parties. The 
second part gives information about the Turkish judicial and political system as well as 
                                                          
35
 The main opposition party refers to the opposition party with the largest number of 
seats in the parliament.   
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the institutional design of judicial review in Turkey. The third part introduces the data, 
empirical model and key variables. The fourth part is the empirical section where the 
main hypotheses are tested and results presented. The last part will conclude the study 
by discussing both theoretical and practical implications of the findings. 
 
 
 
4.2 Strategic Litigation as a Triggering Aspect of Judicialization: 
The Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
The judicialization of politics refers to the processes by which “courts and 
judges come to make or increasingly dominate the making of public policies that had 
previously been made by other governmental agencies” (Vallinder, 1995: 13). In this 
sense, the pursuit of politics through the “medium of legal discourse” appears as the 
central aspect of a judicialization process (Shapiro and Stone-Sweet, 2002). Since 
courts are invited regulators in this process, the political elites’ decision to channel 
political conflicts through constitutional litigation triggers the judicialization of politics.  
There are two main reasons for why judicialization inevitably follows from the 
establishment of courts with constitutional review powers. First, by awarding 
parliamentary minorities the right to refer legislation for judicial review, a significant 
opportunity emerges for the use of litigation for counter-majoritarian purposes. In 
parliamentary politics strong and disciplined parties control the legislative process, 
whereas the opposition parties use the few remaining opportunities to constrain the 
policies adopted by the governments supported by the majorities in parliament. All this 
might be countered if majorities enjoyed the ability to reverse judicial rulings and force 
courts to abide by their wishes (Magalhaes, 2003). However, at this point a second 
factor gains importance: constitutional courts are independent and insulated from the 
interests of majorities and executives. For that reason litigation by opposition parties 
turns the judiciary into a third higher chamber in law production replacing the 
traditional forms of legislative organization, unicameralism or bicameralism, by 
“tricameralism” (Lane and Ersson, 1999: 166).  
In this regard, Stone-Sweet (2000) argues that the interaction between the courts 
and legislators is conditioned by two underlying structural factors. First, the mode of 
judicial review (abstract or concrete review) exercised by the constitutional court. 
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Second, the extent to which the parliamentary majorities seek to enact radical reform 
legislation. Accordingly, Stone-Sweet (2000:50) suggests that the political systems 
which contain abstract review, experience more judicialization than the systems that do 
not. He also suggests that the more radical the legislation adopted by the majority in the 
parliament, the more likely that the law will be referred to the constitutional court 
(2000:52). On the other hand, Ryan (2010) presents a favorable legal framework, a 
relatively autonomous judiciary and organizational support for policy litigation as the 
main sets of enabling conditions for the judicialization of politics. However, it is 
important to stress that these enabling conditions, by themselves, cannot explain what 
triggers the judicialization in the first place. In other words, they provide an opportunity 
for taking policy claims to the courts, but they cannot account for the factors which lead 
to the judicialization of policy issues. In order to designate these factors one should first 
elucidate the reasons of why the political elites in the opposition would choose to go to 
the court instead of addressing the problematic legislations through traditional political 
forums even though the judiciary is not fully independent. 
When a political opposition party decides to refer a bill to the court for its 
annulment, is it because the opposition party truly disagrees with the legal standing of 
the bill? Or is it for some other reason? The conventional response for the litigation 
processes initiated by the opposition parties asserts that the “losers” of a policymaking 
process decide to turn to the courts, because they cannot achieve their policy goals 
through political means (Stone-Sweet, 2000). According to this kind of explanation, the 
opposition parties should be willing to bring courts into the legislative process 
whenever government policies deviate from their preferences. At first sight, the loser 
argument seems a very reasonable because it fits very well with the traditional view of 
the courts as defenders of minorities against the potential abuses of the incumbent 
government (Ryan, 2010). However, identifying a litigation process merely in terms of 
winners and losers does not provide a thorough vision into the phenomenon of 
judicialization of politics. First, having the constitutional power to send each and every 
bill - which has been enacted by the incumbent government- to the constitutional court, 
the main opposition party can hardly be defined as a “looser” in a strict sense. Second, 
the “looser” argument appears to envision that the only concern of the main opposition 
party who brings a bill in front of the constitutional court for judicial review is to win 
the case.  
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By recasting the connection between the choices opposition parties make and 
the constraints they face, in the following part of the chapter I explore a new set of 
answers to the question that asks why and when the opposition political parties 
frequently bring cases in front of the constitutional court and choose to judicialize 
politics although the judiciary is not fully independent. At the core of the argument is 
the idea that opposition parties go to the court not because they truly disagree with the 
legal standing of the bill but because they want to use litigation as a strategic tool to 
achieve their policy and political objectives.  
 
 
 
4.2.1 The Logic and Theory of Strategic Litigation 
 
 
So far we laid the groundwork for identifying litigation as a distinct form of 
behavior that a political opposition party adopts when faced with a problematic bill in 
the parliament. The central argument of this chapter suggests that as election time 
approaches the opposition parties become more willing to go to the court. Yet the effect 
of the approaching election is hypothesized to be conditioned on the opposition party’s 
prediction of its post-election placing. I refer to this phenomenon as “strategic 
litigation”. Because a strategic litigation makes sense only if the opposition parties 
believe that litigation will improve their fate, the next step is, therefore, to develop a 
unified theoretical framework.  
An implicit assumption underpinning the strategic litigation argument is that the 
political elites in the opposition are rational actors who place a higher value on 
achieving their political objectives than on the resolution of the case in line with a legal 
standing. Another assumption sustaining the strategic litigation theory is that the 
opposition parties might not care much about the final decision of the judges when 
deciding whether to refer a statute to the court. By contesting a policy in the court it 
may be possible to secure a political victory without achieving a legal victory. The final 
simplifying assumption of the strategic litigation theory is that an opposition party has 
complete and perfect information about the election results. Based on these 
assumptions, I derived strategic litigation as a logical response used by the political 
opposition parties to achieve their political objectives.  
Figure 4.1 provides a basic setting that illustrates the logic of strategic litigation. 
The figure depicts a sequence of decisions with the majority in the parliament  (P1) 
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moving first, the main political opposition party (OP1) second, the court (C ) third, 
nature (N) fourth, the future majority in the parliament (P2) fifth and the future main 
opposition (OP2) party sixth. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Strategic litigation game 
 
 
 
 
----------I-------------------I--------------------I----------------I--------------------I-------------------I----------- 
time 
            P1                      OP1                      C                     N                        P2                     OP2 
promulgates a law      litigates or not              decides        determines next    promulgates a law   litigates or not 
                                the law to the court        for/against        majority in                                         the law to the court 
                                                                                   the parliament 
 
 
In the first stage, the majority in the parliament acts by promulgating a law. In 
the second stage, the main opposition party in the parliament decides whether to refer 
that law to the constitutional court or not. In the third stage, the constitutional court 
decides to annul the law or not. In the fourth stage Nature selects the next government. 
With a probability p the main opposition party will be part of the incoming 
government. It will either hold a majority of the seats in parliament and act as a single 
party government or form a coalition government with another political party. With a 
probability 1-p it will be acting as the main opposition party or as a small opposition 
party or it will be totally ousted from the parliament. In the final stages, the future 
majority in the parliament tries to promulgate another set of laws and the main 
opposition party decides whether to refer that law to the constitutional court or not.  
Through litigation the opposition parties are able to challenge the 
unconstitutionality of legislative bills before the constitutional court. For that reason, 
judicializing a bill makes it easier to highlight the policy differences between the 
opposition party and incumbent government. For instance, an opposition party can 
convert a problematic legislation into a public debate in which there is only a "good" 
side to be advocated. Freedom and human rights, democracy, political corruption, 
economic growth or social justice are the issues that can be used in this sense (Stokes, 
1963). Thus by accusing the majorities of violating constitutional rules and referring 
legislation for abstract review, the opposition parties can attempt to place themselves 
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on the “right” side (and the majorities on the “wrong” one) of a debate regarding these 
issues (Magalhaes, 2003). As a result, the use of litigation by an opposition party to 
differentiate its policy preferences from the policies of the incumbent government, may 
increase public awareness, foster public discussion, bring pressure for social and 
legislative change, cast doubt on governmental policies or discredit them.  
The main argument of this chapter posits that the effect of the approaching 
election on the opposition party’s use of litigation is conditioned on its prediction about 
the general election results. This is because the cost-benefit calculations of an 
opposition party who predicts to be part of the incoming government will be quite 
different from the opposition party who expects to lose the general election and 
continue to act as an opposition party. If the opposition party expects to lose the 
forthcoming election it will have nothing to lose from frequently going to the court 
prior to the election. Under this situation the opposition party foresees that in the post-
election period it will be acting as the main opposition party or as a small opposition 
party or even worse it will be totally ousted from parliament. For that reason the 
opposition party will try to use all available means to highlight the distinction between 
its policy preferences and the policies enacted by the incumbent government. Presented 
as a testable hypothesis the first prediction is as follows.  
 
Hypothesis-1: The main opposition party would increase its use of litigation as 
election time approaches once the prospect emerges that it will lose the general 
election and act as the main or a small opposition party in the parliament. 
 
On the other hand, if the main opposition party foresees itself winning the 
upcoming election and holding a majority of seats in parliament or becoming part of a 
coalition government, it will not tend to use litigation as a policy differentiating 
mechanism because when the opposition party is likely to win power the costs of 
pursuing litigation will overweigh the marginal benefits. Although the immediate costs 
of referring a problematic legislation to the court might be zero, the long-term electoral 
and political costs of frequently turning to the court might be great (Stone-Sweet, 
2000:198). For instance, if the opposition party has some chance of becoming part of 
the incoming government, a policy based on obstructionism would constrain its future 
legislative freedom making it vulnerable to destructive criticisms once it tries to pass 
similar laws from parliament. Hence, the main opposition party - who envisions 
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winning the upcoming general election - may decide to change the problematic bills by 
itself instead of losing time in the litigation process and wait for the decisions of the 
court.  And the second prediction can be stated as follows. 
 
Hypothesis -2: The main opposition party would not increase its use of 
litigation as election time approaches once the prospect emerges that it will have 
an electoral victory and either hold the majority of seats in parliament or 
become part of a coalition government. 
 
In line with these hypotheses, the theory of strategic litigation suggests that the 
changes in the opposition party judicial behavior depend on changes in the opposition 
party’s beliefs and expectations about the results of the upcoming general election. For 
that reason, evidence would be inconsistent with these hypotheses if the opposition 
parties which were expecting to lose the upcoming general election did not significantly 
increase their use of litigation as election time approached or if the opposition parties 
which were expecting to win the future general election did significantly increase their 
use of litigation as election time approached.  
 
 
 
4.3 The Constitutional Court, Governments and Opposition Parties in Turkey 
 
 
 
Controlling the executive and legislative actions through a higher judicial organ 
has been one of the most significant developments in the history of democratic regimes. 
In Germany and Italy, for example, constitutional courts were created after the Second 
World War as a reaction to the abuses of political regimes. In Turkey, the establishment 
of the constitutional court, however, dates back to the Constitution of 1961, which was 
drafted following the 1960 military coup
36. The court’s creation was a response to a 
prevalent perception among the military elite that the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, 
DP), which controlled a parliamentary majority between 1950 and 1960, had abused 
executive power in an effort to eliminate political opposition and destroy the basic 
principles of the republic (Arslan, 2002). The shortcomings of the 1961 system led to a 
                                                          
36
 Turkey’s experience with parliamentary democracy dates back to 1945, but its recent 
history is characterized by three military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980. 
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revision in the role of the constitutional court after the 1980 military coup. With the 
adoption of the new constitution in 1982, the Turkish Constitutional Court was 
transformed into an administrative agent whose function was stated to depend on 
assisting the Kemalist elite, enhancing the power of the state, promoting the ideology of 
the regime, regulating the political arena and facilitating the transformation of the 
society to the level of contemporary civilization (Shambayati, 2004; Shambayati and 
Kirdis, 2009). 
According to the regulations laid down in the 1982 Constitution, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court was given considerable powers and authority to deal with 1) 
annulment cases which are filed on the grounds that laws, decree-laws, regulations of 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly or certain articles or provisions thereof are 
against the constitution as to its form and merits and 2) annulment of the amendments 
to the constitution which contradict with the constitution in terms of the form (The 
Constitution of Turkish Republic, Article 148)
37
.  
Since the action for annulment is abstracted from any particular case, matters 
falling under these items can be brought before the Turkish Constitutional Court for 
abstract review
38
. Abstract review procedures in Turkey are a posteriori. This means 
that the legislation in question must first be promulgated before its constitutionality can 
be challenged. Actions of annulment on the grounds of unconstitutionality must be 
initiated within 60 days of publication in the Official Gazette (The Constitution of 
                                                          
37
 Article 148 also indicates that the Turkish Constitutional Court has authority to 
consider 1) decisions concerning procedures referred by other courts; 2) in the capacity 
of Supreme Court, to try the President of the Republic, members of the Council of 
Ministers, the presidents and members of the Constitutional Court, the Court of 
Cassation, the Council of State, the Military Court of Cassation, the High Military 
Administrative Court, the chief prosecutors, the deputy Chief Public Prosecutor, the 
presidents and members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, and of the Court of 
Accounts, on offences relating to the exercise of their functions; 3) to try cases relating 
to the dissolution of political parties; 4) to control the constitutionality of the finances 
of political parties in addition to their revenues and expenses; 5) to render annulment 
decisions in cases where the Grand National Assembly of Turkey decides to waive the 
parliamentary immunity of a member or disqualify him/her from membership, or to 
waive the parliamentary immunity of ministers who are not deputies; and 6) to perform 
the other functions assigned to it by the Constitution. 
38
 With the constitutional amendments of 2010 concrete review is included among the 
duties of the Turkish Constitutional Court. In contrast to the annulment actions, 
incidental proceedings can also be initiated by any individual and are not subject to any 
time limitation. However our data does not include these cases. 
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Turkish Republic, Article 151). Furthermore, no allegation of unconstitutionality shall 
be made with regard to the same legal provision until ten years elapse after publication 
in the Official Gazette of the decision of the court dismissing the application on its 
merits (The Constitution of Turkish Republic, Article 152).  
The constitutional validity of laws may be challenged directly before the 
Turkish Constitutional Court through an annulment action by persons and organs 
empowered by the constitution. Accordingly, the President of the Republic; the 
parliamentary group of the main party in government
39
; the main opposition party; or a 
minimum of one-fifth of the total number of members of the unicameral parliament 
have the right to apply for annulment action to the constitutional court. In the situation 
of a coalition government, only the party in power with the largest number of 
parliamentary members can apply for an annulment before the court (The Constitution 
of Turkish Republic, Article 150).  
The President of Turkish Republic has the authority to return any law to the 
Parliament for review before its promulgation. But this is not a very strong veto power 
because if the parliament enacts the same law without amendment, then the president 
must promulgate it. Since the unicameral parliamentary system allows the incumbent 
political party to dominate the executive and legislature in the Turkish legislative 
processes, constitutional review provides the only veto point available to the opposition 
parties and members of parliament. For that reason, the opposition parties’ effort to 
block the policies of the incumbent government focuses on this single veto point. 
As in other countries with abstract review, most cases are brought before the 
Turkish Constitutional Court by the parliamentary opposition, a practice that increases 
the potential for the judicialization of the political process. Although smaller parties 
have been excluded from referring bills and decrees for abstract review, the largest 
parties in the opposition have always enjoyed the ability to litigate against laws passed 
by the parliamentary majorities. The frequency with which the Turkish political parties 
have used litigation has led the former President of the Turkish Constitutional Court - 
Mustafa Bumin- to complain that the constitutional court has become “like a senate” 
(Hürriyet Newspaper, 15 May 2003).  
                                                          
39 Giving the right of referral to the main party in power seems meaningless. It is 
unlikely that a party that controls the government will challenge the constitutionality of 
a law that it itself has passed. This power, however, can be useful if there is a change in 
the government within the 60 days period for referrals. 
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The theoretical framework of this chapter suggests that only under certain 
political conditions will the main opposition parties go to the court more frequently. In 
order to better understand when the main opposition parties prefer to use judicial 
mechanism we should first look at the political context within which the opposition 
parties have operated. Table 4.1 shows that as a unicameral parliamentary democracy, 
Turkey had sixteen legislative terms between the years 1983-2011 and in seven of these 
terms the incumbent has enjoyed a majority government, in the other two the 
incumbent formed minority government and in the remaining seven the incumbent 
formed coalition governments. Despite these sixteen legislative terms, only seven 
national elections were held during the period 1983-2011. This reveals that the cabinet 
turnovers in Turkey were not necessarily followed by a general election and that 
Turkey bears the characteristics of a developing democracy where governments may 
suddenly collapse or leave office early.  
In the general election which was held in November 1983, the Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) had a landslide victory capturing nearly 45 percent of the 
votes. On the other hand, by winning 30 percent of the votes the Social Democratic 
People’s Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP)40 was the main opposition party in 
the parliament. Under the first ANAP government important economic reforms and 
austerity measures were implemented that in turn created economic recovery and 
progress. As a result, having won 36.3 percent of the votes in the general election that 
was held in November 1987, the ANAP once again formed a single party government, 
whereas the SHP won 24.7 percent of the votes and was once again the main opposition 
party in parliament. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 Prior to 1985, the SHP was called the People’s Party (Halkçı Parti, HP). In 1985, 
merging with the Social Democratic Party (Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi, SODEP), the HP 
formed the SHP.  
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Table 4.1: Governments and opposition parties in Turkey, 1983-2011 
 
Period Governing Party(ies) Type of government Main Opposition Party 
December 1983-December 1987 ANAP Single party/ majority SHP  
November 1987 (general election) 
December 1987-November 1989 ANAP Single party/majority SHP 
November 1989-June 1991 ANAP Single party/majority SHP 
June 1991-November 1991 ANAP Single party/majority SHP 
October 1991 (general election) 
November 1991 - May 1993 DYP 
SHP 
Coalition/majority ANAP 
June 1993 - October 1995 DYP 
SHP 
Coalition/majority ANAP 
October 1995 DYP Single party/minority ANAP 
October 1995 - March 1996 DYP 
CHP
41
 
Coalition/majority  ANAP 
December 1995 (general election) 
March 1996 - June 1996 ANAP 
DYP 
Coalition/majority RP 
June 1996 - June 1997 RP 
DYP 
Coalition/majority  ANAP 
June 1997 - January 1999 ANAP 
DSP 
DTP 
 
Coalition/minority 
                  
                  RP
42
, FP 
January 1999 - May 1999 DSP Single party/minority FP 
April 1999 (general election) 
May 1999 - November 2002 DSP 
MHP 
ANAP 
 
Coalition/majority 
 
FP
 43
 
November 2002 (general election) 
November 2002 - July 2007 AKP Single party/ majority CHP 
July 2007 (general election) 
July 2007 - June 2011 AKP Single party/ majority CHP 
June 2011 (general election) 
June 2011 - AKP Single party/ majority CHP 
Party Names: ANAP (Motherland Party), SHP (Social Democratic People’s Party), DYP (True Path 
Party), CHP (Republican People’s Party), RP (Welfare Party), DSP (Democratic Left Party), DTP 
(Democratic Turkey’s Party), MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), FP (Virtue Party), AKP (Justice and 
Development Party) 
 
                                                          
41
 With the military coup in 1980, the CHP was banned from elections. In 1992, the 
CHP was reopened and in 1995 the SHP merged with the CHP.  
42
 The RP was closed down by the Turkish Constitutional Court in January 1998, on the 
grounds that it sought to undermine Turkey’s secular institutions. 
43
 In 2001 the FP was closed down by the Turkish Constitutional Court, which had 
decided that the FP was a continuation of the banned RP. Until the general election in 
2002, the DYP was the main opposition party in the parliament. 
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After the general election held in October 1991, the SHP
44
 formed a coalition 
government together with the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP). Although in 
the general election of 1991 the vote shares of the SHP (20.6 %), the DYP (27.2%) and 
the ANAP (24 %) were very close to one another, from 1991 until the general election 
held in 1995, the ANAP was the main opposition party in the parliament. The 1991 
election marked important developments in the re-democratization process in Turkey. It 
ended the period of one-party dominance in Turkey, marked the return of coalition 
governments and underscored the growing fragmentation of the Turkish party system 
(Sayarı, 1996). 
Because of a devastating economic crisis in 1994, in the general election held in 
1995 the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) increased its vote share 
surprisingly winning 21.38 percent. The victory of the RP opened up a series of 
discussions on the democratic regime in Turkey. The state elites, in particular the 
military, were alarmed by the RP’s electoral victory due to its pro-Islamist roots and 
anti-systemic tendencies. This skepticism was aggravated further during the RP-DYP 
coalition government. The polarization between the pro-secular and pro-Islamist forces 
eventually led to a major crisis in 1997, which resulted in the ouster of the coalition 
government from power under mounting pressure from the military (Sayarı, 2007). In 
January 1998, the main opposition party (the RP) was legally banned from politics and 
closed down by the Turkish Constitutional Court on the grounds that it sought to 
undermine Turkey’s secular institutions.  
In the early general election held in 1999, the Democratic Left Party 
(Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi, MHP) and the ANAP formed a coalition government winning 22.2, 18 and 13.2 
percent of the votes, respectively. Winning 15.4 percent of the votes, the Virtue Party 
(Fazilet Partisi, FP) acted as the main opposition party until it was closed down by the 
Turkish Constitutional Court in 2001 on the grounds that it was acting against the 
secularist principles of the Republic and was formed as a continuation of the banned 
RP.  
                                                          
44
 In 1995, the SHP merged with the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi, CHP). 
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Following the financial crisis in 2001, the political credibility of the DSP-MHP-
ANAP coalition government was seriously undermined. And in the general election 
held in November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi, AKP)
45
 had a landslide victory. After winning 34.2 percent of the votes, the 
AKP controlled an absolute parliamentary majority by capturing 66 percent of the seats 
(363 out of 550)
46
. This represented the largest parliamentary majority enjoyed by any 
party in Turkey since the 1987 elections. Controlling the remaining third of the 
parliamentary seats was the CHP which became the main opposition party and the 
principal rival of the governing AKP. Faced with the AKP’s huge majority, the CHP 
had little effective influence over shaping public policies. Moreover, the CHP’s failure 
to devise new electoral strategies and policies to broaden its popular appeal seriously 
undermined its chances to present itself as an alternative to the AKP (Sayarı, 2007). 
Given these reasons and the successful economic performance of the AKP government 
during its tenure, the AKP won two more victories in the 2007 and 2011 general 
elections, whereas the CHP continued to be the main opposition party.  
The strategic litigation theory should be tested in a political framework where 
the lives of the political opposition parties show continuity. Nevertheless, the 1995-
1999 and 1999-2002 periods in Turkish politics mark important drawbacks for testing 
the strategic litigation theory. One year prior to the general elections held in 1999 and 
2002, the main opposition parties, at the time (the RP and FP), were legally banned 
from politics and closed down by the Turkish Constitutional Court. For this reason, 
during the 1995-1999 and 1999-2002 periods Turkey did not have a single main 
opposition party which could formulate a strategic policy for the upcoming elections.  
                                                          
45
 “The Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded by Tayyip Erdogan, only 
one year before the election. The AKP was perceived as the continuation of the 
previous pro-Islamist parties (RP and FP). The perceived ideological moderation of the 
AKP, along with the decisions of several former ANAP and DYP officials to join 
Erdogan’s new party, helped it to attract many voters who had previously supported the 
established centrist parties” (Sayarı, 2007:201). 
46
 “The Turkish electoral system is a proportional representation system with 
multimember districts under the d’Hondt formula and a 10 percent national threshold 
that parties must pass to qualify for seats. For that reason the AKP won nearly two-
thirds of the seats with about one-third of the vote; the CHP controlled the remaining 
one-third of the parliamentary seats with only one-fifth of the popular vote, and close to 
45 percent of the votes were effectively wasted since they went to parties that failed to 
clear the 10 percent barrier” (Sayarı, 2007:200). 
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4.4 Data, Measurement and Model 
 
 
 
The aim of this study is to analyze whether the willingness of the political 
opposition parties to go to the constitutional court changes in accordance with their 
expectations about the upcoming general election results. In other words, does an 
opposition party who expects to win or lose the general election decrease or increase its 
referrals to the court respectively? In this study, I use an original data set that is based 
on all laws and decree-laws passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly between 
the years 1984 and 2011. In order to test the strategic litigation theory, we need a 
political framework where the life of an opposition party shows continuity. Yet as 
previously stated, the periods of 1995-1999 and 1999-2002 do not provide an 
appropriate political framework to test the strategic litigation theory since one year 
prior to the general elections held in 1999 and 2002 the main opposition parties (the RP 
and the FP) were legally banned from politics and closed down by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court.  
In this regard, the data set is based on laws and decree-laws passed by the 
Parliament during the following five governmental periods: the first ANAP government 
(January 1984- November 1987); the second ANAP government (November 1987- 
October 1991); the DYP-SHP government (October 1991- December 1995); the first 
AKP government (November 2002-July 2007); the second AKP government (July 
2007-June 2011). The starting and ending dates of each governmental period refers to a 
general election. The total number of laws and decree-laws passed by the Parliament 
during these five governmental periods is 2933
47
. Each law and decree-law is coded 
dichotomously according to whether the main opposition party sent the regarding law 
to the Turkish Constitutional Court or not. For that reason, all cases filed by the main 
                                                          
47
 521 of the laws were passed under the first ANAP government (January 1984-
November 1987); 492 laws were passed under the second ANAP government 
(November1987- October 1991); 446 laws were passed under the DYP-SHP 
government (October 1991-December 1995); 914 laws were passed under the first AKP 
government (November 2002-July 2007); and 560 laws were passed under the second 
AKP government (July 2007-June 2011). 
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opposition parties to the Turkish Constitutional Court during the given periods are 
analyzed. This corresponds to 281 cases
48
. 
All this data is used to assess whether the patterns of the main opposition 
parties’ behavior adhere to the approaching election, as predicted by the theory of 
strategic litigation. I compare the behavior of the main opposition parties who expect to 
win and those who expect to lose the upcoming general election. Hence, inferences 
about strategic litigation are based on whether the willingness of the main opposition 
party to go to the court changes relative to changes in its expectations about the election 
results.  
The dependent variable of this study, litigation, is a binary variable that 
measures whether the main opposition party brings a law/decree before the 
constitutional court for abstract review. Litigation is coded 1 if the main opposition 
party brings a law/decree before the constitutional court and 0 otherwise. Given that the 
dependent variable is dichotomous, binary logistic regression is the appropriate 
estimation technique.  
Since the main argument of this study posits that the impact of the approaching 
election on the litigation frequency is conditioned by the main opposition party’s 
prediction of upcoming general election results, we need a measure of the political 
opposition parties’ expectations about these election results. Because it is impossible to 
measure directly the opposition parties’ beliefs about their own and the incumbent 
government’s future, I generate proxy measures for the opposition parties’ expectations 
by drawing on the local election results. I suggest that local elections provide important 
information to the opposition parties about their future electoral success and serve as 
the earliest source of information about the results of the upcoming general elections. 
In their influential study, Anderson and Ward (1996) argue that local elections 
are “barometer elections” which are used by the citizens to send signals to key political 
actors regarding the incumbent government. For that reason local elections are stated to 
                                                          
48
 281 laws and decree-laws are sent to the Turkish Constitutional Court by the political 
opposition parties during the January 1984-December 1995 and November 2002- June 
2011 periods. 23 laws are sent to the court under the first ANAP government (January 
1984-November 1987); 35 laws are sent under the second ANAP government 
(November 1987- October 1991); 48 laws are sent under the DYP-SHP government 
(October 1991-December 1995); 100 laws are sent under the first AKP government 
(November 2002-July 2007); 75 laws are sent under the second AKP government (July 
2007-June 2011). 
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reflect changes in public attitudes toward the incumbent government as a response to 
political and economic conditions. Similar to the British by-elections and German land 
elections that have been defined by Although Anderson and Ward (1996) as barometer 
elections, Turkish local elections also provide some clues as to future voting trends in 
general elections (Çarkoğlu, 2009).  
In the Turkish case when we compare the results of each local election and the 
subsequent general election we see that local elections successfully predict the 
following general election results. For instance, under the second ANAP government 
the changing mood of the electorate became evident in the local elections of March 
1989 when the ANAP suffered its first major loss. On the other hand, winning 28 
percent of the votes, the main opposition party, the SHP, came out as the winner of this 
local election. This event served as an early sign of the SHP’s success in the general 
election to be held in October 1991. Similarly, the local election conducted under the 
DYP-SHP government in March 1994, was an early indication that the ANAP - the 
main opposition party at the time - would be able to become part of the incoming 
government
49
. Finally, the local elections conducted under the first and second AKP 
governments, in March 2004 and March 2009 respectively, served as the earliest source 
of information about the results of the general elections to be held in 2007 and 2011
50
.  
Suggesting that local elections signal certain information to the main opposition 
party about the general election results, I created a series of dichotomous timing 
variables that allow me to model the changes in the opposition parties’ perceptions 
about the upcoming general election results
51
. Since on average the local elections have 
                                                          
49
 Winning 21 percent of the votes each, both the ANAP and DYP were the winners of 
the local elections held in March 1994. The devastating economic crisis of the year 
1994 resulted in very high annual inflation rates, domestic debt crisis and high rates of 
unemployment. This financial crisis was the most important aspect that decreased the 
incumbent parties’ vote shares and increased the ANAP’s vote share.  
50
 In the 2004 local election, the AKP won 41 percent of the votes, whereas the CHP 
won 16 percent of the votes. As a result, the AKP finished first in 57 of the 81 mayoral 
contests. The AKP’s electoral success at local level has greatly enhanced its political 
power. Similarly, in the 2009 local election, the AKP, with about 39 percent of the 
vote, was about 16 percent ahead of its main competitor, the CHP (Çarkoğlu, 2009). 
Both of these local elections signaled that the AKP would have a landslide victory in 
the general elections held in 2007 and 2011. 
51
 The major assumption underlying the strategic litigation is that the opposition party’s 
perception - that the government will lose power or that the opposition party will be 
part of the incoming government- increases the probability of a law to be sent to the 
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been conducted two years prior to general elections, I take the final 18 months before 
the general election as the earliest point of information about the upcoming election 
results. In this regard, I adjust the cutoff points at eighteen, twelve and six months to 
examine the effects of changes on the main opposition party’s behavior under different 
relative amounts of certainty and information. These cutoff points yield a series of 
independent variables- final 18 months, final 12 months and final 6 months- which 
allow me to assess patterns in the main opposition party’s decision making over time. 
This helps me to compare the behavior of the main opposition party under periods of 
relative certainty to their behavior under periods of relative uncertainty. For each 
dummy variable I assign a value of 1 to all laws falling within the mentioned period of 
approaching election. All other laws take a value of 0.  
 
 
 
4.5 An Analysis of Strategic Litigation to the Turkish Constitutional Court 
 
 
 
The key hypothesis of this study predicts that when the opposition party thinks 
that it will lose power in the upcoming general election and not be part of the incoming 
government it will send the laws passed by the parliament more frequently to the 
constitutional court as the election time approaches. The second hypothesis, on the 
other hand, envisages that once the main opposition party expects to be part of the 
incoming government, it may decrease (or at least it would not significantly increase) 
the number of litigations to the court as the election approaches.  
Given the evidence that the main opposition parties under the first ANAP 
government, as well as the first and second AKP governments lost the general elections 
and continued to act as the main opposition parties, the specific prediction is that each 
of these main opposition parties should increase their willingness to go to the court in 
the final years of each governmental period. By contrast, since the main opposition 
parties under the second ANAP government and the DYP-SHP government won the 
upcoming general elections and succeeded in becoming part of the incoming 
governments, I suggest that these main opposition parties lacked similar incentives to 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Court. For that reason I treat timing variables as dichotomous but not as a continuous 
variable that measures the elapsing time per se.  
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use litigation as a strategic tool at the end of these two governmental periods. Thus, 
evidence would be consistent with both strategic litigation hypotheses if the main 
opposition parties’ referrals to the constitutional court increased at the end of the first 
ANAP government, the first and second AKP governments but decreased or did not 
change at the end of the second ANAP government and the DYP-SHP government.  
Showing trends in the laws sent by the main opposition parties to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court by year, Figure 4.2 clearly fits with the patterns predicted by the 
hypotheses of the current study. Under the first ANAP government, between the years 
1984 and 1987, the main opposition party, the SHP, sent on average 6 percent of the 
laws to the constitutional court. Yet one year prior to the election, the opposition party 
increased the number of laws referred to the court to 10 percent. Similarly while under 
the first and the second AKP governments the main opposition party sent on average 12 
and 15 percent of laws to the constitutional court, one year prior to the election the 
percentages of laws sent to the court by the main opposition party, the CHP, peak at 15 
and 16 percent respectively. This trend underscores the intuition that once the main 
opposition party becomes certain that it will lose the upcoming election it goes more 
frequently to the court as the election approaches.   
 
 
Figure 4.2: The percentage of laws referred by the opposition parties to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court, January 1984 - June 2011 
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By contrast under the second ANAP government (1987-1991) and the DYP-
SHP government (1991-1995) there was no increase in the number of laws sent to the 
constitutional court by the main opposition parties at the time. Instead, consistent with 
the second hypothesis, the trend in the laws sent to the court shows that as it became 
more likely that the main opposition party would be part of the incoming government 
the percentage of the laws sent to the court declined or did not change as the election 
approached. For instance, under the second ANAP government the main opposition 
party, the SHP, sent 6 percent of the laws to the constitutional court on average. Yet 
one year prior to the election, in 1991, it sent only 3 percent of the laws to the court. On 
the other hand, under the DYP-SHP coalition government the main opposition party 
sent 10 percent of the laws to the court on average, whereas during the final year of the 
outgoing government it sent only 6 percent of the laws to the court. This trend 
underscores the intuition that once the main opposition party becomes certain that it 
will win the upcoming election it decreases its number of referrals to the court as the 
election approaches.   
Figure 4.2 also shows that there is a considerable variation in the use of 
litigation across different legislative periods. The fractionalization in government 
(single party government or coalition government); the durability of the incumbent 
party in office; and the ideological difference between the main opposition party, the 
incumbent party(ies) and the constitutional court might be some of the crucial factors 
affecting this variation. 
First, under a coalition government the decision-making process in the 
parliament will involve larger number of political parties and will be comprised of give 
and take among the coalition members. Thus minority parties in the parliament will 
find a way to directly involve themselves in the decision-making process. An 
incumbent party with a majority in parliament, however, would have fewer incentives 
to seek consensus with the main opposition party (Hagan, 1993). Additionally, under 
single party government the incumbent party would be able to take more radical 
reforms and decisions. For these reasons, under single party government the opposition 
parties might more frequently turn to the court. Second, the durability of the incumbent 
government might be another important aspect that may affect the frequency of 
litigation. The longer a political party has been in the majority, the more that party is 
likely to seek radical legislative reforms and this may direct the opposition party to 
obstruct these policies through all other means. Third, when the opposition parties use 
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litigation as a tool to achieve their policy objectives they will also take into 
consideration the likely outcomes of judicial decision-making and refrain from bringing 
into the policy-making process the courts which would probably be sympathetic to 
majority preferences. For that reason, the ideological differences between the 
incumbent party, the main opposition party and the court do also affect the opposition 
parties’ use of litigation. For instance, high levels of ideological difference between the 
incumbent party and the opposition party might increase the opposition party’s 
frequency to go to the court as long as the court has similar preferences to those of the 
opposition party.  
Although in this chapter I argue that the frequency of the use of litigation by the 
main opposition party depends on the approaching time of the election and that this 
impact is conditioned by the opposition party’s predictions about the election results, 
these three political factors might also affect the use of litigation. For that reason, while 
testing the core hypotheses of the study, I suggest controlling for the impact of the 
above stated political factors. In this regard, I employed separate binary logistic 
regressions for each governmental period.  
 
 
 
4.5.1 Empirical Results 
 
 
The results for each governmental period are presented in Table 4.2. In this 
table we see three sets of models. In the first group of models (Models 1, 4, 7, 10, 13) 
time-to-election variable is calculated by assigning a value of 1 to all laws passed by 
the Parliament within 18 months prior to the general elections and 0 otherwise. In the 
second (Models 2, 5, 8, 11, 14) and third groups of models (Models 3, 6, 9, 12, 15) 
time-to-election variable is calculated by focusing on 12 and 6 months prior to the 
general elections respectively.  
I discuss the results presented in Table 4.2 in conjunction with Table 4.3, which 
present a clear substantive view of the results, showing the probability of litigation by 
the main opposition party for three specific time periods: 18, 12 and 6 months prior to 
the general election. Table 4.3 also presents the baseline probability of litigation for 
each governmental period. This allows one to see how the predicted probability of 
litigation is compared to the baseline probability. The baseline probability is calculated 
by holding time-to-election variables constant to 0.  
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Table 4.2: The main opposition party’s litigation to the constitutional court by time to 
election 
  
          Time to election=                              
18 months prior to election 
 
 
Time to election =                    
 12 months prior to election      
   
Time to election = 
 6 months prior to election  
                                            First ANAP government,1984-1987 
  
                                                                 Model 1                                     Model  2                                         Model 3 
Constant -3.45*** --3.48*** -3.31*** 
 
(0.31) (0.29) (0.25) 
Time to election 0.90** 1.19** 1.18** 
 
(0.43) (0.43) (0.47) 
Number of observations 522 522 522 
Prob>Chi-square 0.03 0.007 0.02 
                                          Second ANAP government, 1987-1991 
 
                                                               Model 4                                        Model 5                                        Model 6  
Constant -2.47*** -2.55*** -2.54*** 
 
(0.21) (0.19) (0.18) 
Time to election -0.32 -0.07 -0.46 
 
(0.39) (0.42) (0.74) 
Number of observations 492 492 492 
Prob>Chi-square 0.40 0.87 0.51 
                                                                                          DYP-SHP coalition government, 1991-1995 
 
                                                               Model 7                                        Model 8                                        Model 9 
 
Constant -2.11*** -2.09*** -2.08*** 
 
(0.19) (0.17) (0.15) 
Time to election -0.02 -0.12  -0.37 
 
(0.31) (0.37) (0.62) 
Number of observations 446 446 446 
Prob>Chi-square 0.96 0.74 0.53 
                                              First AKP Government, 2002-2007 
 
                                                               Model 10                                       Model 11                                     Model 12 
Constant -2.28*** -2.26*** -2.22*** 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Time to election 0.59** 0.79*** 0.77** 
 
(0.22) (0.24) (0.26) 
Number of observations 914 914 914 
Prob>Chi-square 0.008 0.001 0.005 
                                              Second AKP Government, 2007-2011 
 
                                                                Model 13                                   Model 14                                       Model 15  
Constant -1.95*** -1.94*** -2.04*** 
 
(0.18) (0.17) (0.15) 
Time to election 0.14 0.137 0.529** 
 
(0.25) (0.24) (0.26) 
Number of observations 564 564 564 
Prob>Chi-square 0.56 0.58 0.04       
Note: The unit of analysis is a law promulgated by the parliament, coded 1 = if the regarding 
law is sent to the Constitutional Court by the main opposition party, 0 = if the law is not sent to 
the Constitutional Court by the main opposition party. Cell entries are logistic regression 
coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
  p ≤ 0.1    p ≤ 0.05     p ≤ 0.001, two-tailed test 
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Starting with the first ANAP government, the results for Models 1–3 presented 
in Table 4.2 overwhelmingly support the first strategic litigation which suggests that 
when the main opposition party expects to lose the upcoming election it will 
increasingly go to the court as the election approaches. Consistent with this prediction, 
every time-to-election coefficient for the first ANAP government contained in Models 
1, 2, and 3 is positive and statistically significant. Table 4.3 shows that eighteen, twelve 
and six months prior to the election, the probability of the main opposition party going 
to the court increased by 4,6 and 7 percentage points, respectively.  
Repeating the analysis for the first AKP government, we also get equally 
impressive results. For instance the coefficient contained in Models 10, 11, and 12 is 
positive and statistically significant. Table 4.3, on the other hand, shows that eighteen, 
twelve and six months prior to the election, the probability of the main opposition party 
going to the court increased by 6, 10 and 10 percentage points, respectively. 
Somewhat less convincing are the results for the second AKP government. 
Although the coefficients in Models 13 and 14, which examine the main opposition 
party’s referrals to the constitutional court, are positive during the last eighteen and 
twelve-months prior to election, they fall short of statistical significance. But Model 15 
shows that six months prior to the election the main opposition party significantly 
increases its referrals to the constitutional court. According to the predicted 
probabilities presented in Table 4.3, compared to the first four years of the second AKP 
government, in the final six months prior to the general election the main opposition 
party was more likely to go to the constitutional court by 6 percentage points. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Predicted probabilities-litigation by the main opposition parties 
 
   Prob. of Litigation 
 
Baseline 18 months  12 months 6 months 
First ANAP government 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.1 
First AKP government 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.19 
Second AKP government 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.18 
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On the other hand, repeating the same analysis for the second ANAP 
government and the DYP-SHP government I find that the results strongly support the 
second hypothesis. Models 4-9 show that when the main opposition party expects to 
win the upcoming general election it would not significantly increase its referrals to the 
court as the election approaches. Every election coefficient for the second ANAP 
government and the DYP-SHP government contained in Models 4- 9 is negative. For 
that reason, one might even argue that when the opposition party expects to be part of 
the incoming government, as election time approaches the main opposition party would 
less frequently go the court. But since the coefficients are not statistically significant, 
Models 4-9 at least confirm the expectation that going to the court would not increase 
as election time approaches when the main opposition party expects to win the 
upcoming election.  
As election approaches the incumbent government may tend to pass laws 
dealing with certain issues to increase its vote share or secure its interests/policies after 
it leaves office. Hence, if the subject of laws passed by the legislature changed with the 
approaching election time, how can one know whether the increase in the number of 
cases referred by the opposition party to the court was driven by strategic litigation or 
simply by the change in the mix of laws passed by the parliament? In this regard, not 
the main opposition party’s electoral expectations but the mix of laws passed by the 
legislature might account for the increase in the probability of sending laws to the court 
for abstract review. For that reason, I now consider an alternative explanation for the 
increase in the main opposition party’s referrals to the court. 
To examine this alternative explanation, I ran binary logistic regressions for the 
first ANAP government, as well as the first and second AKP governments with the 
issue variables included in the database (see Appendix C). The results presented in 
Table 4.4 suggest that a change in the mix of laws does not erase the timing effect 
predicted by the theory of strategic litigation. Consistent with the strategic litigation 
argument, Models 16, 17 and 18 show that even after controlling for the issue 
categories the coefficients for the final 12 months to the general election remain 
positive and significant. Table 4.4 also displays that the laws involving issues related to 
government operations, legislature, economy, and welfare and human services were 
significantly more likely to be sent to the court by the main opposition parties. 
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Table 4.4: The laws sent to the Turkish Constitutional Court by the main opposition 
parties, controlling for the issues of the laws passed by the Turkish Parliament 
 
Independent variables Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
  
  
  
Constant -4.66*** -2.71*** -2.52*** 
  (0.6) (0.17) (0.23) 
12 months to election(First ANAP government) 0.78* 
 
  
  (0.46) 
 
  
12 months to election (First AKP government) 
 
0.59**   
  
 
(0.25)   
12 months to election (Second AKP government) 
  
0.48* 
  
  
(0.27) 
Judiciary & Justice 1.38 -0.21 1.57*** 
  (0.92) (0.48) (0.44) 
Government Operations 1.63** 1.77*** 2.33*** 
  (0.78) (0.33) (0.73) 
Legislature 3.40*** 0.68 1.94** 
  (0.78) (0.65) (0.76) 
Economy 1.70** 1.35*** 1.45*** 
  (0.77) (0.29) (0.40) 
Welfare and Human Service 1.68** 1.01** 0.85* 
  (0.77) (0.33) (0.49) 
  
  
  
Number of Observations 522 914 564 
Significance of Chi square 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: The unit of analysis is a law promulgated by the parliament, coded 1= if the regarding 
law is sent to the Constitutional Court by the main opposition party and coded 0= if not sent to 
the Court. Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* p<0.1 ** p< 0.05 ***p<0.001 
 
 
Although the patterns identified in Tables 4.2-4.4 empirically support the 
existence of strategic litigation in the Turkish context, showing how this strategy works 
in practice is important as well. The main opposition parties’ talks during their election 
campaigns reveal the practical implications of our theory. In this chapter I have 
suggested that a main opposition party uses litigation as a tool to differentiate its policy 
preferences from the incumbent government’s policies. And when the main opposition 
party expects to lose the upcoming general election it will more frequently go to the 
court to underline these political differences. In line with this argument, we see that one 
month before the 2011 general election, the main opposition party, the CHP, made 
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some referrals to one of the cases that it brought before the constitutional court. 
Regarding the land registry law that has been challenged by the CHP, in his talk to the 
people, the leader of the CHP differentiated the incumbent government’s policy and 
their future policy on this issue. And finally he said: “This is the difference between us 
and the AKP. We are on the side of all citizens, whereas they are on the side of their 
supporters” (Habertürk Newspaper, 17 May 2011). This statement clearly reveals how 
the strategic litigation works in practice.   
 
 
 
4.5.2 Robustness Check  
 
 
In this part of the chapter I conduct a robustness check to see whether the results 
are robust to an alternative operationalization of the dependent variable. The number of 
laws sent to the constitutional court by the main opposition party per month is a good 
proxy to measure the opposition party’s willingness to go to the court. For this reason, I 
constructed a monthly data set which includes the number of laws sent to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court by the main opposition parties during the first ANAP government 
(January 1984 - December 1987), the first AKP government (November 2002- July 
2007) and the second AKP government ( July 2007-June 2011). This corresponds to 
147 months during which 218 cases were sent to the constitutional court by the main 
opposition parties. As the election time approaches the incumbent government may 
tend to pass a higher number of laws in the parliament. This in turn may lead to a 
higher number of referrals to the court. For that reason I also control for the number of 
laws passed by the parliament
52
. 
Since the values of the dependent variable are discrete, an ordinary least squares 
regression would not generate efficient parameters. Although the data of the dependent 
variable are strongly skewed to the right, the variance (2.75) is almost two times that of 
the mean (1.48). Furthermore, the dependent variable - number of laws sent to the court 
by the main opposition party per month- may not be independent across months. Each 
                                                          
52
 The Turkish Constitution (Article 151) envisions that the right to apply for 
annulment directly to the Constitutional Court lapses 60 days after the contested law’s 
publication in the Official Gazette. For that reason I calculated the number of laws that 
can be sent to the court as follows. For instance, in May 2007 the number of laws that 
can be sent to the constitutional court is 91. This is calculated by taking the sum of the 
laws passed in May (41 laws), April (18 laws) and March (32 laws).  
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year the Turkish Parliament goes into recess on July 1 and restarts its workings on 
September 30. During these three months the parliament usually does not pass new 
laws and the main opposition party does not go to the Court. So that the number of laws 
sent to the court by the main opposition party during these three months is usually zero. 
For all these reasons the Poisson distribution does not seem to be a good fit
53
. Thus I 
use a negative binomial regression model to test the influence of the approaching 
election time on the number of cases sent to the constitutional court by the main 
opposition parties.  
 
 
Table 4.5: Negative binomial regression analysis of the laws sent to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court under the first ANAP government, the first and second AKP 
governments 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent 
Variables 
18 months prior 
to election 
12 months prior 
to election 
6 months prior 
to election 
  
  
  
Constant -0.12 -0.12 -0.04 
  (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) 
Time to election 0.21 0.35* 0.58** 
  (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) 
Number of laws passed 0.009** 0.009** 0.007** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  
  
  
Number of Observations 147 147 147 
Significance of Chi square 0.005 0.001 0.000 
  
Note: The unit of analysis is month. The dependent variable is the number of cases sent to the 
Constitutional Court by the main opposition party. Cell entries are negative binomial regression 
coefficients.  Standard errors are in parentheses.* p<0.1 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53
 The large value of chi square in the goodness of fit that is obtained after running 
Poisson regression also indicates that Poisson distribution is not a good choice.  
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Table 4.6: Negative binomial regression analysis of the laws sent to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court  
       18 months prior to election    12 months prior to election         6 months prior to election  
                                            First ANAP government,1984-1987 
  
Constant -1.97** --2.11*** -1.90*** 
 
(0.57) (0.53) (0.48) 
Time to election 0.63 1.09** 1.41*** 
 
(0.46) (0.44) (0.44) 
# laws 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Number of observations 47 47 47 
Prob>Chi-square 0.037 0.005 0.001 
                                          Second ANAP government, 1987-1991 
 
Constant -1.20** -1.25** -1.14** 
 
(0.46) (0.48) (0.44) 
Time to election 0.04 0.15 -0.27 
 
(0.34) (0.39) (0.53) 
#laws 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of observations 47 47 47 
Prob>Chi-square 0.06 0.06 0.05 
                                                                                          DYP-SHP coalition government, 1991-1995 
 
Constant -1.34** -1.03** -1.33*** 
 
(0.45) (0.46) (0.46) 
Time to election 0.06 -0.01  0.06 
 
(0.32) (0.40) (0.55) 
# laws 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of observations 50 50 50 
Prob>Chi-square 0.01 0.01 0.01 
                                              First AKP Government, 2002-2007 
 
Constant 0.06 0.10 0.20 
 
(0.25) (0.23) (0.22) 
Time to election 0.34* 0.43** 0.60** 
 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.23) 
# laws 0.009** 0.008** 0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of observations 56 56 56 
Prob>Chi-square 0.03 0.01 0.007 
                                              Second AKP Government, 2007-2011 
  
Constant 0.21 0.26 0.46** 
 
(0.19) (0.18) (0.17) 
Time to election 0.43 0.70** 1.24*** 
 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.34) 
#laws 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Number of observations 47 47 47 
Prob>Chi-square 0.12 0.02 0.002       
Note: The unit of analysis is month. The dependent variable is the number of cases sent to the 
Constitutional Court by the main opposition party. Cell entries are negative binomial regression 
coefficients.  Standard errors are in parentheses.* p<0.1 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001 
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Analyzing the combined data set for the first ANAP government, as well as the 
first and second AKP governments, Table 4.5 shows that when the main opposition 
party thinks it will lose the upcoming general election it increases its referrals to court 
as the election time approaches. Conducting a separate negative binomial regression 
analysis for each governmental period Table 4.6 shows that the previous findings are 
still supported. The empirical findings show that as the main opposition party perceives 
that it will lose the upcoming election it will more frequently go the court as the 
election approaches, whereas when it thinks that it will win the upcoming election the 
number of referrals does not show a significant change as the election approaches.  
 
 
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
The European model of judicial review entails the establishment of special 
constitutional courts which are able to veto bills and declare laws passed by the 
parliament unconstitutional usually following referrals by the political opposition 
parties. Parliamentary minorities have strong incentives to use their access to courts as 
a tool with which to place veto pints especially when they are prevented from 
influencing the context of policy. By this model of judicial review legislative policy-
making is placed under the shadow of constitutional law and politics becomes 
judicialized. While studying judicial review and the judicialization of politics, scholars 
have long focused on the judicial behavior and political context within which the 
judges operate while ignoring the role and motivations of the actors who invite the 
judicial intervention in the first place. Since cases do not come to the courts at random, 
it is crucial to understand why and when the political issues are judicialized instead of 
addressed and resolved through traditional political forums.  
This study has explored the proposition that the opposition party’s perception 
about the election results affect its willingness to go to the court. At the core of the 
argument is the idea that opposition parties go to the court not because they truly 
disagree with the legal standing of the bill but because they want to use litigation as a 
strategic tool to achieve their policy and political objectives. Once the main opposition 
party is weak and starts to believe that it will lose the upcoming election, as election 
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time approaches it faces the incentive to turn to the constitutional court to differentiate 
its policy preferences from the policies enacted by the incumbent government. By using 
litigation as a policy differentiating mechanism, the main opposition party believes that 
it will increase its vote share. On the other hand, if the main opposition party foresees 
itself winning the upcoming election and holding a majority of seats in parliament or 
becoming part of a coalition government, it does not tend to use litigation as a policy 
differentiating mechanism because when the opposition party is likely to win power the 
costs of pursuing litigation will overweigh the marginal benefits. Hence, the main 
opposition party - who envisions winning the upcoming general election - prefers to 
change the problematic bills by itself instead of losing time in the litigation process and 
wait for the decisions of the court. These two arguments are defined as the central 
components of strategic litigation theory and the empirical results from the Turkish 
case strongly support this theory. 
Several broader implications emerge from examining the opposition parties’ use 
of the judiciary. The empirical analysis presented here not only reveals the starting 
point of the judicialization of politics but also suggests that the nature of judicialization 
of politics may differ depending on whether the political opposition actors expect to be 
part of the incoming government. With respect to a broader question about democratic 
consolidation, strategic litigation presents the use of litigation by the parliamentary 
minorities as an instrument to challenge the policies of the incumbent government 
especially when these minorities are prevented from influencing the content of policy in 
any other way. With respect to the rule of law, however, litigation appears as the main 
determinant of judicial empowerment that is crucial to control and constrain the actions 
of the government.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Judicial independence is believed to provide a lot of benefits ranging from 
economic development (North and Weingast, 1989), the maintenance of democratic 
order (North, Summerhill, and Weingast, 2000), the protection of civil and political 
rights (Powell and Staton, 2009; Howard and Carey, 2004) to overcoming political 
“ungovernability” (Hirschl, 2004). Yet, it remains hard to underline the conditions that 
determine judicial independence.  At the intersection of law and politics a significant 
number of scholars tried to account for the determinants of judicial independence and 
most of these scholars have linked the creation and maintenance of judicial 
independence to democratic processes and the rule of law. For instance, the insurance 
theory presents the existence of electoral competition as the source of political 
uncertainty that makes the political actors perceive independent courts as a mechanism 
that would protect them from the opposition’s attack after future electoral change 
(Ginsburg 2003; Finkel 2008). Similarly, the separation-of-powers approaches - which 
identify the courts as strategic actors who can anticipate the reaction of the elected 
politicians and act accordingly- operate on democratic logic. According to their 
explanations fragmentation in electoral politics creates a space for independent judicial 
review. For these reasons, the recent increase in the number of democratic countries 
around the world raised the demand for scholarly inquiries about the strategic 
relationship between the political actors and the constitutional courts.  
My dissertation project starts by constructing a general model that accounts for 
the political incentives in maintaining judicial independence. Testing the insurance 
logic of judicial independence across 97 democratic countries I show that under similar 
political conditions the incumbent governments in advanced and developing 
democracies adopt different incentives in maintaining the judicial independence. The 
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empirical findings reveal that while in advanced democracies high levels of political 
competition enhance judicial independence, in developing democracies political 
competition significantly hampers the independence of the courts.  
To better determine the influence of political factors on the independence of the 
judiciary in the context of developing democracies, I continue my analysis by focusing 
on a single developing democracy, Turkey. Testing the logic of separation of powers 
approaches and their proposed link between the political fragmentation and judicial 
behavior I try to account for whether the government structure influences the Turkish 
Constitutional Courts’ invalidation of laws and whether this impact changes across 
certain case level characteristics. While the existing literature has assumed that the 
political context exhibits uniform effects across cases, I show that the impact of 
government structure on the court’s decisions changes across cases in a systematic way. 
For instance, when the court reviews an unfriendly law and when the litigant is an 
opposition party, the constitutional court appears to be less concerned about the 
external political constrains and judges act more in line with their own preferences. 
Following these two analyses that have tried to account for the political factors 
that affect the judicial behavior in the context of developing democracies, the final 
question of this dissertation project asks “Why do the opposition parties frequently 
bring cases in front of the constitutional court and choose to judicialize politics 
although the judiciary is not fully independent?” I argue that the approaching time of 
the general election affects the frequency of the main opposition party’s referrals to the 
constitutional court and this effect is conditioned on the opposition party’s prediction of 
its post-election office. I refer to this phenomenon as strategic litigation theory and 
empirical evidence is derived from Turkey. 
 
 
 
5.1 Limitations of the Study 
 
 
 
The first limitation of this dissertation is the question of generalizability. In 
Chapter 3 and 4, I tested my hypotheses using Turkey as a case study. It is certainly 
possible that the same empirical analyses could yield very different results when other 
democratic countries are used as case studies. Regarding Chapter 4, for instance, I 
should note that this study is the first to formulate the strategic litigation theory and test 
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it; therefore, the findings from this chapter should be viewed cautiously until other 
researchers verify these results in the context of other countries.  
Another potential limitation of this dissertation might include the possibility 
that the empirical results presented in Chapter 2 are time bound. Due to data limitations 
I have selected the time period of 2000 to 2008 for each country studied. Since the 
political competition variable changes only with the national election and in 8 years’ 
period a country can have two general elections in average, time- series cross-section 
analysis was not appropriate. And by aggregating the data to include average scores 
within an 8-year period I was not able to show the direct effect of short-term changes in 
political competition on the changes in judicial independence. For that reason my 
empirical analysis provides an indirect test of the mechanism that is proposed. So when 
other researchers get data for longer time periods, the replication of this study would be 
a very promising area for future research. 
In addition to these limitations, one can also make some objections against what 
has been argued in this dissertation and I would like to focus on these possible 
objections. Regarding Chapter 3, one objection might be that, I wrongly assume that 
judges do not care about following the law as such but only about political outcomes of 
their decisions. Nevertheless, I am not arguing that while taking decisions judges do not 
care about the law and established norms of adjudication at all. It is difficult to imagine 
a judge who is taking a decision without taking into consideration the legal rules, norms 
and principles. Following the attitudinalist and separation-of-powers approaches I argue 
that legal rules governing decision making in the cases that come to the court do not 
limit the discretion of judges so that judges may freely implement their personal policy 
preferences (Segal and Spaeth, 2002). 
Another objection regarding Chapter 4 might be against the logic of strategic 
litigation. One might argue that when a political opposition party decides to refer a bill 
to the court for its annulment, it is just because the opposition party truly disagrees with 
the legal standing of the bill. Although I do not ignore this possibility, I argue that 
while an opposition political party brings a case in front of the constitutional court it 
cares more about its political and policy objectives rather than the legal standing of the 
bill. One can easily observe this condition in real life cases. For instance, in Turkey 
before the general election which was held in June 2011, the main opposition party- the 
CHP- made some promises on land registry issue. Yet, these promises were highly 
criticized by the media and the incumbent government since in 2009, the CHP had sent 
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a law – which was very similar to the one it promised to promulgate - to the 
constitutional court and the court strike it down (Star Newspaper, 18 April 2011). This 
example explicitly reveals that the main opposition parties prioritize their political 
objectives rather than the legal standing of the bills.  
 
 
 
5.2 Future Research 
 
 
 
The theoretical frameworks developed in Chapter 3 and 4 open up several areas 
for future research. While it is hoped that the arguments and theories proposed in these 
two chapters are generalizable to other high courts and countries, even if it is not, the 
findings herein still hopefully shed some light on strategic behavior of the Turkish 
Constitutional Court and main opposition parties in the Turkish context. I hope, in a 
future research, to replicate these two studies in developing as well as established 
democracies. This type of research will not only help me to assess the generalizability 
and robustness of the proposed theories and arguments but also to delineate whether the 
applicability of these theories show considerable difference in the context of advanced 
and developing democracies.   
The strategic litigation logic developed in Chapter 4, for instance, can be 
applied to other developing democracies but the scholars should take into consideration 
a few points. First, evaluating the theory in other contexts will only be successful if the 
political and judicial context of the country is suitable for testing this theory. There 
should be an opposition party that has a secure place in the parliament during two 
consecutive general elections. Moreover, this theory should be evaluated in 
democracies where the constitutional court exercises abstract review. Second, I must 
admit that testing the findings of Chapter 3 and 4 in a large-N analysis will solve the 
generalizability problem of this dissertation to a greater extent. Yet it is difficult to 
collect data and identify systematically the beliefs and preferences of the actors and 
judges. Without such information on the independent variables we cannot fully test the 
hypotheses presented in this study.  
On the theoretical side, some issues also merit future attention. First, regarding 
the strategic litigation theory I present highlighting policy differences as the mechanism 
that lies behind the judicialization of a bill. Yet another avenue for further research 
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might try to account for whether these same conclusions hold true if we alter our 
assumptions about what opposition political parties want from litigation. For example, 
an opposition party might care solely about blocking the policies of the incumbent 
government or decrease its legitimacy. In this alternative scenario, it is not immediately 
obvious whether strategic litigation has the same intuitive appeal.  
 
 
 
5.3 Relevance and Implications of this Project 
 
 
 
The results of this dissertation are relevant for both policymakers and scholars 
of comparative politics and law. Chapter 3, for instance, has showed that case-level 
factors such as identity of the litigant and origin of the law significantly affects the 
influence of political factors on the judicial decision-making. Chapter 4, on the other 
hand, has indicated that once the main opposition party expects to lose the upcoming 
election, it tends to go to the court more frequently as the election date approaches. 
These two findings provide essential insights to the policy makers since they would 
now better know when their policies would be more frequently sent to the 
constitutional court for judicial review and under what conditions the court will be 
more likely to strike them down.  
For scholars in the field of judicial politics, on the other hand, Chapter 2 has 
served to further understand the insurance logic of judicial independence in a cross-
national perspective. Until now the insurance logic of judicial independence has been 
tested across a few numbers of countries whose democratic consolidation levels were 
not taken into consideration. Testing the insurance theory across 97 countries, I showed 
that the positive relationship between judicial independence and political competition 
that is suggested by the insurance theorists appears to exhibit a negative relationship in 
developing democracies. Thus, the findings of this chapter reveal that the scholars in 
the field of judicial politics should be more careful about the generalizability of certain 
theories.  
Having noted the relevance of this study, it is appropriate to consider some of 
the implications of the findings herein. Chapter 3, for instance, has demonstrated that 
the constitutional court in Turkey is motivated, to a greater or lesser degree, by the 
government structure, political alignment between the court and the enacting 
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government, as well as the identity of the litigant. Thus, the belief that judges only take 
into consideration legal factors when deciding cases is discarded in the Turkish case.  
The strategic litigation theory proposed in Chapter 4, on the other hand, 
provides a starting point to answer the question that has not been addressed by the 
judicial politics scholars: why do the main opposition parties tend to frequently bring 
laws in front of the high court although the judiciary is not fully independent?  In this 
chapter, I have empirically showed that the main opposition party tends to go to the 
constitutional court more frequently once it expects to lose the upcoming general 
election. This finding also discards the belief that the main opposition parties use 
abstract review power of the judiciary only when they disagree with the legal standing 
of the bill and that the opposition parties go to the court only to win cases.   
The findings of Chapter 3 carry also additional implications for the legal 
strategies employed by other social and political actors. A major debate in the U.S. 
judicial politics literature is whether courts can become effective agents of social 
change (see Epp, 1998). A primary concern is that judges often do successfully defend 
the status quo, rather than pushing forward a rights revolution. Similarly, the findings 
of Chapter 3 show that when a law passed by the Parliament is stated to violate the 
individual rights, the judges do not tend to vote sincerely but continue to take into 
consideration the possible reactions from the incumbent government. In other words, 
legal activism does not appear as a productive avenue for those seeking profound social 
change (but see McCann, 1994). 
In addition, Chapter 3 and 4 have hopefully served to improve our knowledge 
about the relationship between the judiciary and political actors in Turkey. Thus, this 
project has provided an important step towards generating an extensive database of the 
Turkish Constitutional Court decisions and integrating this Court – which is 
understudied at this point - into the large body of existing research in comparative 
political institutions and judicial politics. Finally, as has been noted previously by 
various scholars in the field of judicial politics, the empirical findings of this 
dissertation show that it is impossible to think of judiciary as an institution isolated 
from and independent of any external political factors and institutions 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Governments and Opposition Parties in Turkey, 1983-2011 
Period Governing Party(ies) Type of government 
December 1983-December 
1987 
ANAP Single party/ majority 
December 1987-November 
1989 
ANAP Single party/majority 
November 1989-June 1991 ANAP Single party/majority 
June 1991-November 1991 ANAP Single party/majority 
November 1991 - May 
1993 
DYP 
SHP 
Coalition/majority 
June 1993 - October 1995 DYP 
SHP 
Coalition/majority 
October 1995 DYP Single party/minority 
October 1995 - March 
1996 
DYP 
CHP
54
 
Coalition/majority  
March 1996 - June 1996 ANAP 
DYP 
Coalition/majority 
June 1996 - June 1997 RP 
DYP 
Coalition/majority 
June 1997 - January 1999 ANAP 
DSP 
DTP 
 
Coalition/minority 
January 1999 - May 1999 DSP Single party/minority 
May 1999 - November 
2002 
DSP 
MHP 
ANAP 
 
Coalition/majority 
November 2002 - July 
2007 
AKP Single party/ majority 
July 2007 - June 2011 AKP Single party/ majority 
 
Party Names: ANAP (Motherland Party), SHP (Social Democratic People’s Party), DYP (True Path 
Party), CHP (Republican People’s Party), RP (Welfare Party), DSP (Democratic Left Party), DTP 
(Democratic Turkey’s Party), MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), FP (Virtue Party), AKP (Justice and 
Development Party) 
                                                          
54
 With the military coup in 1980, the CHP was banned from elections. In 1992, the 
CHP was reopened and in 1995 the SHP merged with the CHP.  
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Appendix B 
 
To better compare the impact of each case-level factor to the scenario where 
this factor is absent but where other factors exist, I present a table and figure of 
predicted probabilities that are calculated by taking the mean of all variables. In this 
regard, the table stated below exhibits that under the rule of a unified government when 
the court reviews unfriendly laws instead of friendly laws the probability of striking 
down laws increases by 37 percent. Similarly, under unified government when the court 
reviews cases that are brought by political actors instead of other courts the probability 
of striking down laws increases by 43 percent. Yet, under unified government when the 
court reviews cases whose referral reasons include violation of individual rights 
corresponds only to 2 percent of positive change in the probability of striking down 
laws. 
 
 
 
Predicted Probabilities-Decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court 
                    Prob. Strike 
 
Under unified 
government 
Baseline 0.63 
Friendly law 0.45 
Unfriendly law 0.82 
Political litigant 0.83 
Non-political litigant 0.40 
Violation of individual rights 0.65 
No violation of Individual rights 0.63 
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Predicted Probability of strategic voting as a function of case-level factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
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0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
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0.9
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law
friendly law political
litigant
non-political
litigant
violation of
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no violation
of individual
rights
baseline porbability of strategic voting 
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Appendix C 
 
The issue variables are coded as follows:  Judiciary and Justice= 1 when the law 
involved issues related to the judiciary, justice or civil rights. Government 
Operations=1 when the law involved issues related to local governance or government 
employees. Legislature=1 when the law involved issues related to political parties, 
general elections and the parliament. Economy= 1 when the law involved issues related 
to taxes, budget, trade, financial regulation, debt and general economy. Welfare and 
human services=1 when the law involved issues related to social security, social 
welfare, poverty, education, health care, assistance, housing and urban development.    
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